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PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS
NIREJ S. SEKHON *
In theory, courts are only supposed to incarcerate an individual after having provided
her with the host of procedural protections required by constitutional criminal procedure –
appointed counsel and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to name just two. In practice however,
individuals are routinely incarcerated for violating injunctions to which criminal procedure’s
protections do not apply. At any given time, millions are subject to such injunctions and hundreds
of thousands are in jail or prison for having violated one. Child support orders and probation
orders are the most common examples of what this article terms “punitive injunctions.” Just last
term, in Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court once again concluded that constitutional criminal
procedure does not apply to the enforcement of such injunctions. This article argues that courts
have inordinately used punitive injunctions against the poor and socially marginal. Punitive
injunctions expand the pool of individuals who may be incarcerated and extend the time any
particular individual is subject to custodial supervision. Contrary to official accounts, punitive
injunctions do not meaningfully advance remedial or rehabilitative purposes. Rather, their
widespread use demonstrates that the United States has unjustifiably taken a punitive course in
managing poverty. Extending constitutional criminal procedure to the enforcement of punitive
injunctions would be better than the status quo. But it would only be marginally better. For that
reason, this article proposes farther-reaching reforms that would limit courts’ power to impose
such injunctions in the first place.
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INTRODUCTION
In theory, a host of procedural protections, including a heightened burden of proof and
right to appointed counsel, make it difficult for the State to incarcerate individuals. In practice,
however, courts routinely incarcerate individuals for violating injunctions to which the reasonable
doubt standard and other protections associated with criminal procedure do not apply. These
“punitive injunctions” can take various forms, but child support orders and probation orders are
among the most common. At any given time, millions of people are subject to such injunctions, 1
and hundreds of thousands are incarcerated for having violated one. 2 Yet, the Constitution
requires only minimal procedural protections when enforcing such injunctions. 3 This, not
surprisingly, raises a host of questions regarding the accuracy and fairness of the detention that
results.
This Article is not primarily a call to increase the procedural protections that apply when
courts enforce punitive injunctions. More aggressive reform is necessary because punitive
injunctions are more than just a procedural oversight in our system of justice. These injunctions
are intimately bound with how courts, and “mass justice” courts in particular, 4 use the threat of
custodial detention to control the poor and socially marginal en masse. 5 Contrary to official policy
accounts, these injunctions do not meaningfully serve remedial or rehabilitative purposes.
The facts in the Supreme Court’s recent case of Turner v. Rogers illustrate how such
injunctions operate. 6 In Turner, the Court held that South Carolina need not provide counsel to an
indigent contemnor prior to jailing him. 7 Michael Turner spent a year in jail for failing to pay
court-ordered child support following what might, charitably, be described as an abbreviated
hearing. 8 The Supreme Court decided that, while financially-beleaguered South Carolina need not
pay for Mr. Turner’s attorney, neither should it send the financially-beleaguered Mr. Turner to jail
without a finding that he could actually afford to pay the court-ordered child support. 9 The family

1

See infra notes 172, 173, 223 and discussion (showing that approximately five million persons are subject
to probation orders and twelve million are subject to child support orders).
2

See infra notes 174, 226, 227 and discussion (reviewing quantitative data).

3

The contempt proceeding by which punitive injunctions are enforced is generally considered “civil” while
“probation revocation” does not fit comfortably into either the “civil” or “criminal” categories. See infra Section I.A.
4

See infra Section I.C.

5

It is the poor who inordinately crowd the halls of what I call “mass justice courts.” See infra notes 128142, 173 and discussion.
6

131 S.Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).

7

See id.

8

Id. at 2513-14; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 8, Turner v.
Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (stating that Mr. Turner “spoke a total of 169 words at his hearing” and
“received less than a minute of the court’s time”).
9

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
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court had neglected to make such a finding on the record – meaning, the judge had neglected to
properly fill out the pre-printed form that constituted the court order. 10 One imagines the family
court judge beleaguered in her own right, managing a docket overloaded with cases like Mr.
Turner’s. 11 In South Carolina, around 15% of all persons in jail are there for having violated a
family court order. 12 That this practice helps mothers like Ms. Rogers seems unlikely. The scant
record in Turner suggests that both Ms. Rogers’ and her child’s lives were full of hardship. 13 It
strains the imagination to think that Mr. Turner’s year in jail changed that fact in any significant
way.
Other than pro bono counsel appealing the case to the Supreme Court, little is unusual
about the family court proceeding in Turner. It is broadly representative, not just of contempt
proceedings in family court, but also of how punitive injunctions are imposed and enforced. 14
Like the family court in Turner, low-level criminal courts manage torrents of defendants, most of
whom are charged with petty crimes of the sort unlikely to win anyone much notoriety – such as,
minor drug crimes, low-value thefts, and assaults of the pushing and shoving variety. 15 These
cases are almost never tried; many do not even get past arraignment. 16 They are processed in a
manner that has been called, fairly, “assembly line” justice. 17 Probation is among the most
common criminal sentences imposed by such courts. 18 In some jurisdictions, the vast majority of
convicted defendants receive some form of probation. 19 “Probation revocation” proceedings, for
constitutional purposes, look a lot like the contempt proceeding in Turner.
Consider the plight of a hypothetical defendant who is convicted of misdemeanor theft
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Upon conviction, the court is likely to
impose some term of probation. 20 For relatively minor crimes such as these, the court may impose
probation in lieu of most or even all of the jail time the defendant might have received. The court
is likely to impose conditions that are standard in the jurisdiction for this sort of case – they might
include enrolling in a drug treatment program, regularly submitting to drug testing, and paying
restitution to the theft victim. Provided that the defendant complies with the probation conditions,

10

Id. at 2514.

11

See Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae
In Support of Petitioner at 22-24, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (describing the volume of contempt
proceedings in South Carolina family courts).
12

Id. at 23.

13

See Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, n.6, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).

14

See infra Section I.C (defining “mass justice”).

15

The vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are of this variety. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011)
(citing 2008 study of eleven states that found misdemeanors represented 79% of total caseload).
16

Id. at 306-07.

17

Id. at 295; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 391
(1993) (describing the history of the criminal trial as “quick and dirty affairs” thus negating the theory that plea bargaining
created “assembly line justice”); Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as
Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14 (describing family courts hearings in South Carolina as
“assembly line justice”).
18

See infra notes 226, 264 and discussion reviewing empirical data.

19

See infra note 224 and discussion.

20

Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

17.2_SEKHON_PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS FORMATTED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

178

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

5/8/2014 3:58 PM

[Vol. 17

the jail sentence will remain “suspended.” 21 That sentence will hang over the defendant until the
probation term is complete. Should he violate any condition, the court could subject him to any
portion of the suspended sentence that it sees fit. 22 While he is entitled to a probation revocation
hearing, the Constitution does not require the procedures that apply in criminal cases – including
free counsel and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 23
This Article demonstrates that the traditional equity rationales offered for punitive
injunctions ring hollow. In theory, such injunctions are supposed to allow courts to leverage their
power to detain in order to efficiently incentivize behavior modification. 24 In practice, however,
many of the individuals subject to punitive injunctions do not have the material or social
resources to comply with demanding behavioral or financial conditions. 25 Many of those (like Mr.
Turner) subject to such orders will cycle through custodial detention at substantial cost to the
State. 26 Neither behavior modification nor remediation provides a convincing basis for why that
should be so.
The utility of punitive injunctions is best understood in terms of monitoring and
controlling the poor and socially marginal en masse. Punitive injunctions have powerful net
widening and strengthening effects. 27 Net widening occurs because punitive injunctions give
courts leeway to quickly convict and sentence without having to commit significant up-front
resources. In marginal cases, it may be easier to impose an injunction today (that carries the
possibility of detention tomorrow) than to impose detention today. 28 Once individuals are caught
in the penal net, 29 punitive injunctions will often extend the time they remain there. Those who
are least able to satisfy injunction conditions will tend to remain subject to those conditions for
the longest period of time. During that period, courts have the power to summarily detain
perceived troublemakers without an exacting showing of individual misconduct. For those subject
to punitive injunctions, this will mean, as was true for Mr. Turner, spending intermittent spells,
sometimes quite lengthy ones, incarcerated.
Punitive injunctions do not conform to the traditional notion of judicial power, “the

21

While there are marked similarities between the two, it is important not to confuse probation with parole.
NEIL P. COHEN, 1 THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE §1:1 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter COHEN Volume 1] (summarizing
differences). The former is court imposed and managed while the latter is administratively imposed and managed. Id.
Probation is a criminal sentence while parole is not. Id. There are various kinds of intermediate sanctions that are
homologous to probation. Id. For example, most jurisdictions have some form of “diversion” – if a defendant completes a
probationary term without incident, the court will dismiss the indictment against her. Id.
22

NEIL P. COHEN, 2 THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE §27:3, 27:11 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter COHEN

Volume 2].
23

See infra notes 78-84 and discussion.

24

See infra Sections II.A and II.B.2.

25

See infra note 173 and discussion.

26

See infra notes 197, 198 and discussion.

27

See LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR 134 (George Steinmetz et al. trans., 2009).

28

See infra notes 248-264 and discussion.

29

Loïc Waquant uses expressions like “penal net,” “correctional mesh,” and “carceral wave”
interchangeably. See id at 98, 125, 131. These expressions are used in their intuitive senses to describe the institutions and
processes that we associate with custodial detention and supervision. He uses the net, wave, and mesh metaphors to
suggest both the reach of these institutions/processes and the difficulty individuals have extricating themselves from
custodial detention and or supervision once it has been imposed. See id. at 125-34.
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power to decide.” 30 The ideal of individualized justice ballasts the power to decide. Accuracy and
evenhandedness are its core values. In a criminal case, that means the State must clear heightened
procedural hurdles in order to obtain a conviction. Those hurdles reflect the settled conclusion
that, on average, exercising punitive power is graver than exercising redistributive power. The
power to decide assumes rigid symmetry between process and result: only a criminal process can
beget a criminal result. Courts do not employ punitive injunctions in order to obtain
individualized justice. Rather, the goal is securing obedience from groups imagined by judges and
the public as “problem populations” or “disobedient classes.” 31 Enforcing punitive injunctions is
relatively unconstrained by procedural restrictions. 32 This is because the distinction between civil
and criminal processes is fluid, sometimes to the point of indeterminacy. 33
This Article makes several original descriptive and normative contributions.
Descriptively, it contributes to the sparse literature on contempt and probation. The little
scholarship that does exist tends to treat each as a sui generis doctrinal oddity. 34 These accounts
fail to evaluate the mechanisms’ pervasive sociological effects on marginal communities. By
doing exactly that, this Article helps bridge the gap separating sociological accounts of criminal
justice from legal scholarship. Sociologists have persuasively argued that the United States has
increasingly come to rely upon penal mechanisms to manage poverty. 35 These scholars, however,
do not account for how specific legal mechanisms produce the sociological effects they criticize.
In contrast, legal scholars focus intensively on specific judicial mechanisms, criticizing problems
with accuracy, fairness, and consistency. 36 Legal scholars, however, tend to stop there. This
30

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).

31

See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 129-30 (1990). Socially constructed notions
of deviance have consistently tracked class and other significant cleavages in society. See id. (noting that class and power
relations that prevail in society will shape the understanding of who constitutes a “problem population”); see also NICOLE
HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS 12, 84-85 (1997) (noting the extent to which turn of the century criminal
justice policy was explicitly population-based).
32

See infra Section I.A.

33

See infra notes 86-88 and discussion.

34

Regarding contempt, see, e.g., Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345,
349, 355 (2000) (suggesting that legal categories used in contempt are “confusing” and difficult to apply); Linda S. Beres,
Civil Contempt and the Rational Contemnor, 69 IND. L.J. 723, 756 (1994) (concluding that civil contempt is based on false
premises about why people choose to comply); Earl Dudley, Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1045-46 (1993) (suggesting criminal-civil binary
in contempt is not analogous to any other areas of law); Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of
Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 85, 125- 26 (1992) (noting that contempt
is sui generis and that contempt “is fundamentally different in principle and function from a crime”). Regarding probation,
see, e.g., Cecelia M. Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, -- J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY -(forthcoming), http://ssrn.come/abstract=2232078 6 (arguing that “community supervision” which includes probation may
not reduce incarceration rates); Wayne Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 171, 172 (2003) (stating that “[p]robation . . . represents a singular exception to this massive shift” away from
judicial discretion in sentencing); Daniel Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure For Revoking Probation, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L.
117, 118-19 (2003) (highlighting ostensible anomaly that individuals can be jailed for probation violation on lesser
showing than required for criminal conviction); Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing:
Some Proposals For Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 77 (2000) (“The
continuing existence of this sweeping deference to the quirks and peculiarities of individual sentencing is particularly
striking in today’s political climate . . . .”).
35

See infra notes 124-133 and discussion.

36

See infra notes 139-151 and discussion.
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Article goes farther, arguing that courts’ use of punitive injunctions is best understood as a
method for subduing the poor and socially marginal. Normatively, this Article advocates for
significantly limiting when and how courts use punitive injunctions.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on punitive injunctions
and the techniques used to enforce them. Part I surveys both legal and sociological accounts,
identifying the descriptive gap separating them. Part II, the Article’s analytical core, develops a
descriptive account of punitive injunctions to fill the gap identified in Part I. After identifying
punitive injunctions’ core features, Part II then uses that conceptual framework to analyze child
support orders, probation and problem-solving courts, 37 and finally, in the way of a historical
antecedent, labor injunctions. Part II reveals the range of contexts across which courts have used
punitive injunctions to achieve control over the poor and socially marginal. Part III explains why
requiring additional procedural protections when courts enforce punitive injunctions cannot be the
normative end-all. Part III then advances a proposal to greatly curtail certain courts’ power to
impose punitive injunctions.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Civil Proceeding Yields Criminal Result?
Despite impacting some seventeen million people, 38 contempt and probation revocation,
the mechanisms through which punitive injunctions are enforced, inhabit a legal nether region.
Neither fits comfortably into the axiomatic criminal-civil binary that defines the American legal
tradition. The Supreme Court’s recent Turner opinion illustrates the point.
For years, Michael Turner had been in and out of South Carolina jails for failing to heed
a family court injunction requiring him to pay child support. 39 During each injunction, Mr. Turner
had spent anywhere from a few days to one year in custody. 40 Until his Supreme Court case
though, Mr. Turner never had the benefit of counsel, state-appointed or otherwise. 41 Because Mr.
Turner had been jailed for civil contempt, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that Mr.
Turner was not constitutionally entitled to a state-appointed attorney. 42
Mr. Turner had failed to abide by a 2003 family court order requiring that he pay $51.73
per week in child support. 43 The family court decided that Mr. Turner could pay this amount
based on its finding that Mr. Turner could earn $1386 per month, notwithstanding that the order

37

“Problem solving” courts, such as drug courts, take a therapeutic approach to offenders with a view to
avoiding recidivism. Such offer defendants the opportunity to avoid jail in exchange for complying with court-imposed
conditions of which treatment – e.g., narcotics addiction in drug courts – is the most important. For a full description, see
infra Section II.B.2.
38

See infra note 161 and discussion.

39

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011).

40

Id.

41

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *2-3.

42

Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.Ct. 2010). Long ago, the Supreme Court held that the state must
provide free counsel to indigents in criminal prosecutions. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[A]ny
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.”).
43

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *8-9.
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indicated he was “unemployed.” 44 Mr. Turner’s arrears quickly mounted. 45 By Mr. Turner’s
account, he struggled to retain employment, to overcome substance abuse and physical disability,
and he also spent time in custody for a criminal offense. 46 The family court held him in contempt
of its child support order on five previous occasions. 47 Each time, he was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment that could be purged by paying the arrears. On four of the occasions, Mr. Turner
spent only a short period of time in jail, or avoided it by paying some portion of his arrears. 48 In
the case that went to the Supreme Court, Mr. Turner had been held in contempt for failing to pay
$5,728.76 in arrears. 49 He served twelve months in jail, the statutory maximum. 50 Mr. Turner had
argued that he was unable to pay the arrears, but the family court judge did not make an express
finding regarding that fact. 51
On appeal, Mr. Turner suggested that his inability to pay rendered the South Carolina
contempt proceeding “criminal” in nature: 52 the one year in jail was, in effect, a fixed term of
punishment because he was financially incapable of satisfying the only condition that would have
terminated his confinement. 53 A “criminal” proceeding must conform to constitutional criminal
procedure, which, among other things, requires state-appointed counsel. 54 While the power to
sanction contempt has existed since time immemorial in the Anglo legal tradition, 55 the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt has not. 56 The Supreme Court drew the
distinction more than one hundred years ago despite observing that “[c]ontempts are neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal.” 57
In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, the Court explained that civil contempt “is remedial[] and
for the benefit of the complainant” while criminal contempt “is punitive[] to vindicate the
authority of the court.” 58 In Gompers, the American Federation of Labor’s leadership challenged
contempt orders entered against them for violating an injunction that restrained the tactics they

44

Id. at *8.

45

Id. at *9.

46

Id. at 9, 11.

47

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011).

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 34.

51

See Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2513.

52

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 42-50; see also discussion infra Section I.B (explaining distinction
between civil and criminal contempt).
53

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 16-17, 42. Mr. Turner’s argument was actually somewhat more
nuanced. He argued that he needed a lawyer to help him properly demonstrate inability to pay – the factual question upon
which the distinction between “civil” and “criminal” contempt hinges. Id. 36, 39-40; see infra notes at 67-76 and
discussion.
54

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

55

Non-common law countries do not share this tradition. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER
1–2 (Columbia Univ. Press 1963).
56

There is an early mention of the distinction in STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CONTEMPT § 21 (New
York, L.K. Strouse & Co. 1890); see also Dudley, supra note 34, at 1035-36 (providing historical account of cases leading
up to Gompers).
57

Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).

58

Id.
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could use in protesting Buck’s Stove’s labor practices. 59 The lower court had sanctioned for
contempt despite the fact that the underlying civil dispute had settled. 60 The district court did not
adhere to rules of criminal procedure when imposing the sanction. 61 The Supreme Court deemed
the sanction “criminal.” 62 It explained that a remedial sanction is one that seeks to coerce
affirmative conduct – e.g., surrendering property, paying damages, etc. 63 A contemnor can avoid
incarceration by simply doing as ordered: “[H]e carries the keys of his prison in his own
pocket.” 64 Civil contempt is purely instrumental, a utilitarian mechanism for inducing specific
behavior. In contrast, criminal contempt punishes the contemnor for doing “that which he has
been commanded not to do.” 65 The point is not to induce any specific behavior, but rather to
punish wrongful conduct and “vindicate the authority of the law.” 66
In Turner v. Rogers, Mr. Turner, the alleged contemnor, argued that South Carolina
should have appointed him counsel in order to maintain the contempt proceeding’s civil nature. 67
Mr. Turner accepted the South Carolina legislature’s having labeled the contempt proceeding
“civil.” 68 However, he contended in his brief that, for the label to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, he must have had the financial ability to comply with the child support order. 69 Given
that factual question’s centrality in determining the proceeding’s nature, Mr. Turner argued that
due process obliged South Carolina to provide him with counsel. 70
While rejecting Mr. Turner’s Due Process claim, the Supreme Court did conclude that
the family court should have made an express finding regarding his ability to pay. 71 The Court
remanded for that purpose. 72 The Court also accepted Mr. Turner’s assertion “that ability to
comply marks a dividing line between civil and criminal contempt.” 73 This characterization is
puzzling. In theory, a court’s tolerance for factual error should be lower in criminal cases than
civil ones. 74 Criminal cases require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil cases do not. It is
the nature of a proceeding that determines the allowance for factual error. But the Turner Court
59

Id. at 419-20.

60

Id. at 451-52.

61

See id.

62

See id. at 452, 444-46.

63

See id. at 442.

64

Id. (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)).

65

Id.

66

Id. at 443. This formulation echoes retributive and expressive theories of punishment. Punishment is
meted out for the moral wrong of disobeying the court. By the same token, punishment is a public reaffirmation of the
prohibition’s validity and, more generally, the court’s authority to promulgate it. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 115 (1970).
67

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *38-40.

68

Id. at *6.

69

Id. This was in addition to a more general argument that due process requires counsel whenever
incarceration is a possibility. Id. at *27-37.
70

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *38-4039.

71

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).

72

Id.

73

Id. at 2518.

74

See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“In a criminal case . . . the interests of the
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been
protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”).
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suggests that this relationship is inverted in a contempt proceeding. 75 The threshold question of
what a proceeding’s nature is turns on a factual question that is, itself, subject to error. What
quantum of error is permissible? The answer, of course, depends on the nature of the
proceeding. 76
While not as neatly circular, the process-result relation is no less counterintuitive in the
probation context. Probation entails conditional release in lieu of detention. 77 Typically, detention
is “suspended” for so long as the probationer abides by the conditions specified in the probation
order. Courts have considerable latitude to incarcerate when a probation violation is alleged.
Where a court concludes that an individual has failed to live up to a probation condition, it can
“revoke” probation and impose whatever portion of the suspended sentence remains
outstanding. 78 For example, a court may impose the erstwhile-suspended sentence all at once or
‘unsuspend’ incrementally, imposing short periods of incarceration, but then re-release with a
lower-balance suspended sentence. Returning to the hypothetical defendant from the
Introduction, 79 assume the court imposes probation and suspends a one-year jail sentence where
one-year is the statutory maximum for misdemeanors. If the court finds the defendant has violated
a probation condition, it can impose the entirety of the one-year sentence or some portion of it. If
the court imposed one month of jail for the violation, upon release the defendant would remain
subject to the probation order and have an eleven-month balance of the suspended sentence
hanging over him.
Constitutional due process only requires minimal procedural protections in probation
revocations. A state must generally prove by a preponderance of evidence that the condition was
violated, 80 a state need not provide counsel to the probationer, 81 there need not be a jury trial, 82
and evidentiary rules are relaxed. 83 While revocation may be appealed, the standard of review is
deferential to the trial court. 84 And for short sentences, that right will be moot – i.e., the alleged
violator will have served time for the revocation before the appeal is complete. 85
75

See Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2516. Of course, the Court was not answering the specific question of what
burden of proof must be satisfied in a contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support. This, however, is a central
question whenever a criminal punishment is predicated upon a refusal to abide by a civil order. See Maggio v. Luma
Camera Serv., 333 U.S. 56, 81-92 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (raising issue in the context of a contempt motion in
a bankruptcy proceeding).
76
Respondents highlighted this problem. See Brief of Respondents at *40-42, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct.
2507 (2011) (No. 10-10). They argued that the Court should simply treat the proceeding as civil without regard for the
error problem. Id. at *42.
77

COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, §1:1.

78

COHEN Volume 2, supra note 22, §27:3, 27:11.

79

See supra notes 20-22 and discussion.

80

Piar, supra note 34, at 127; cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973) (stating that probation
hearings must meet minimum requirements of due process then listing the necessary requirements).
81

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 (“We think . . . that the decision as to the need for counsel [for probationers]
must be made on a case-by-case basis . . . .”); see also Piar, supra note 34, at 135 (“[T]he Court struck a compromise,
holding that the right to counsel in revocation hearings should be determined case-by-case . . . .”).
82

See COHEN Volume 2, supra note 21, at §21:49.

83

See id. at §20:11.

84

See COHEN Volume 2, supra note 22, §29:18.

85

See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2508 (2011) (showing that Mr. Turner had served his oneyear jail sentence well before his case made it to the Supreme Court).
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While probation is a “criminal sentence,” 86 any subsequent probation revocation
proceeding is not “criminal.” 87 Ironically, however, the jail-time imposed subsequent to a finding
that probation conditions have been violated is “criminal” even though the revocation proceeding
is not. 88
The structural homology between the child support order in Turner and probation should
be relatively clear. 89 The essential mechanism in both contexts is the same: a conduct rule backed
by threat of detention. While criminal courts have recourse to a larger menu of conditions when
imposing probation, the power to impose a child support order may be broader than it appears on
its face. In Mr. Turner’s case, the support order, at various points, required finding employment
and obtaining addiction counseling. 90 Despite these similarities, legal scholars have not analyzed
the structural homology between these injunctions.
B. Legal Critiques
Despite the millions of people subject to punitive injunctions, neither contempt nor
probation generates very much interest among legal scholars. The dominant scholarly approach to
contempt tends to highlight its doctrinal inconsistency or circularity and criticize the discretion it
affords judges. Most commentators agree that increased procedural protections for alleged
contemnors – i.e., those protections already available to criminal defendants – are the answer.
Quite separately, the few legal writers who have written about probation tend to focus on the
discretion it affords judges and the excesses that discretion enables.
Legal scholars have observed that the criminal-civil binary in contempt is indeterminate
and leaves too much room for judicial manipulation. 91 In his influential piece on contempt, Earl
Dudley noted that the problem dates back one hundred years to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gompers v. Buck’s Stove. 92 Dudley’s primary criticism is that the criminal-civil binary leaves
courts too much room to instrumentally craft sanctions that are “civil.” 93 By strategically using
language suggesting coercive purpose, courts can dodge the more restrictive rules of criminal
procedure. 94 For example, including a “purge clause” in a contempt order will likely secure its

86

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (suspended sentence with probation is a criminal sentence
that cannot be imposed without state-provided counsel); Feiock, 485 U.S. at 639, 639 n.11.
87
Although the Court has not gone so far to refer to it as “civil.” See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
788-89 (1973) (distinguishing probation revocation from criminal trial).
88
Compare Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654 (Once probation is revoked, “the defendant is incarcerated not for the
probation violation, but for the underlying offense.”) with Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 (“Probation revocation . . . is not a
stage of a criminal prosecution . . . .”).
89
The Supreme Court has recognized this in Feicock, 485 U.S. at 637 (noting the similar circumstances of
contemnors and probationers).
90
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *8, *15 n.10. The order to pay was, by implication, an order to
work; the court imputed income to Mr. Turner despite his unemployment at the time the order was entered. See id.
91

See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 34, at 389-90 (arguing that United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994) has made the distinction indeterminate); Dudley, supra note 34, at 1028, 1062; Robert J. Martineau, Contempt
of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 687-88 (1981).
92

See Dudley, supra note 34, at 1037-38.

93

See id.

94

See id. at 1046.
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status as “civil.” 95 A purge clause is a condition that, if satisfied, terminates detention. 96 The
contempt order in Turner required Mr. Turner’s release upon payment of his arrears. 97 Because
courts can condition release upon performance that is highly unlikely, civil contempt allows them
considerable discretion to detain. 98 This combined with the fact that the very court that enters an
order enjoys authority to punish the order’s violation creates unique danger for bias. 99
Some have suggested that the Court should do away with the criminal-civil binary in
contempt all together and rely on due-process interest balancing and focus on a proceeding’s
actual consequences. 100 This echoes legal critiques of the criminal-civil binary in American law
more generally. Courts typically defer to a legislature’s label of “civil” or “criminal.” 101 The
Court has deferred to legislature’s “civil” label even where detention seemed glaringly

95

See Hicks v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624, 640 (1988); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966);
see also Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442 (To be classified as a civil case, the contemnor should be able to “end the sentence and
discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.”).
96

But see Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 836. Announcing a schedule of penalties in advance of the contumacious
conduct may convert an otherwise “civil” contempt sanction into a “criminal” one. Id. In Bagwell, a Virginia court issued
a “complex injunction” against a labor union that contained just such a schedule. See id. at 837. The injunction was
complex because it contained a “detailed” list of “both mandatory and prohibitory provisions.” See id. at 835-6. The Court
hinted that the decree was akin to a legislative and judicial act rolled into one. See id. at 831, 838; see also id. at 840
(Scalia, J., concurring). Introducing “complexity” into the analytic mix, however, destabilizes the criminal-civil binary
further. As at least one commentator has noted that many injunctions are “complex,” including those issued in child
support and domestic violence cases. See Livingston, supra note 34, at 388-90, 91-97.
97
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011). Similarly, in Shillitani the Court concluded that
Shillitani was a civil contemnor for refusing to comply with a civil subpoena because the trial court allowed for his release
if he agreed to testify. See Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 365. Detention cannot be longer in duration than the proceeding for
which the subpoena was issued. Id. at 371.
98

See Beres, supra note 34, at 727-28.

99

See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 34, at 350-51 (noting that threat of bias is most pitched in cases of
“direct contempt” where the contumacious conduct is directed at the judge herself); Dudley, supra note 34, at 1043, 1079;
Meier, supra note 34, at 85.
100

See, e.g., Brooke Coleman, Prison is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2399, 2437 (2013); Dudley, supra
note 34, at 1033, 1081; see also Martineau, supra note 91, at 687-88 (detailing the Wisconsin Judicial Council’s
abandonment of the criminal/civil distinction and imposition of procedural regulations for contempt). Due process interest
balancing requires that courts weigh the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of an individual’s rights against the
additional cost of providing additional process. See Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2517-18.
101

See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 93, 100 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
249 (1980)) (noting that a legislative scheme is to be considered on its face, and also that “‘only the clearest proof’ will
suffice to override . . . what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty”). Hudson was a change of
course after the Court’s decision in Halper. See id. at 101-02 (citing United States v. Halper 490 U.S. 435 (1989)). Halper
had suggested that courts should look beneath legislative labels and consider the punitive effects of a particular “civil”
scheme in ascertaining whether it was actually “criminal.” See id. at 101-02 (citing Halper 490 U.S. at 447) (suggesting
the importance of “assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed”). Following Hudson, courts pay little heed to a
sanction’s punitive effects when considering whether a legislative label of “civil” is constitutionally appropriate; this fact
has not escaped commentators’ notice (or criticism). See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural
Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 126-29 (2008) (noting that weight is given to the manner in which a sanction is labeled
alone); see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1798, 1801 (1992) (stating that courts will avoid labeling a sanction as “punitive” to avoid to evade criminal
procedural rules).
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punitive. 102 Contempt differs from other areas of law in that it is judicial rather than legislative
choice accounts for whether a sanction is criminal or civil. 103 Ordinarily, judicial classifications of
contempt are not entitled to deference while legislative classifications are. 104 But the distinction
between legislative and judicial choice can be quite murky. While the South Carolina legislature
has labeled child support matters “civil,” the legislature has conferred vast discretion on all courts,
including family courts, to use contempt sanctions as they like. 105 Deferring to the legislative
label in a case like Turner is just to defer to the sanctioning court.
While not everyone is happy with the erosion of the criminal-civil binary, 106 scholars
accept that there is a vast grey zone between the two. These scholars agree that more procedural
protections ought to be afforded in many (nominally) civil proceedings. 107 For example, the one
law review article that has discussed contempt sanctions in the child support context at length is
consistent with the mold. 108 Professor Patterson argues that excessive judicial discretion is among
the most significant problems with child support and that increased procedural protections should
be a big part of the solution. 109
As a practical matter, it is unclear how much difference the additional protections would
make to someone like Mr. Turner. Had Mr. Turner been charged and convicted of criminal

102
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350, 361 (1997) (permitting civil detention of sex offenders
following completion of criminal sentence). In the immigration context, lengthy “civil” detention is quite common. See,
e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301-02 & n.10 (2011) (noting how harsh
deportation can be for deportees); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
EMORY L.J. 1003, 1004-07 (2002) (describing instances of immigration detention).
103

Cf. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838; Dudley, supra note 34, at 1046-47.

104

See id.

105

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-620 (1976). The South Carolina statute does not distinguish between
“criminal” and “civil” contempt and allows family courts to sanction at their discretion:
An adult who willfully violates, neglects, or refuses to obey or perform a lawful order of the court,
or who violates any provision of this chapter, may be proceeded against for contempt of court. An
adult found in contempt of court may be punished by a fine, by a public works sentence, or by
imprisonment in a local detention facility, or by any combination of them, in the discretion of the
court, but not to exceed imprisonment in a local detention facility for one year, a fine of fifteen
hundred dollars, or public works sentence of more than three hundred hours, or any combination of
them.
Id.
106
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory And The Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L. J. 775, 814 (1997) (stating that a “middleground” jurisprudence depletes procedural
protections and “undermine[s] the usefulness” of criminal procedure as a whole).
107
See, e.g., Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 101, at 130; Susan R. Klein, Redrawing The Criminal-Civil
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 720-21 (1999) (arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause, among other procedural
guarantees, should be granted in the case of serious civil sanctions); Mann, supra note 101, at 1869-70 (stating that the
more serious the sanction, the more procedure must protect the accused); Dudley, supra note 34, at 1081-92 (suggesting
that criminal procedures used to avoid erroneous convictions should be employed depending on the severity of a given
sanction).
108

See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of
the Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 133 (2008) (noting that due process measures should be afforded
those threatened with civil incarceration).
109

Id. at 133.
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contempt, his sentence would very likely have included some term of probation. 110 And among
the probation conditions would almost surely have been paying child support. 111 As described
above, the Constitution does not require any more of probation revocation hearings than it does of
civil contempt. 112
Legal scholars have had even less to say about probation than contempt. The little that
has been written tends to highlight the extent to which probation is one of the few areas within
criminal justice where courts have retained considerable formal discretion. 113 This is true with
regard to the three central features of probation: 1) How much of a sentence to suspend; 114 2)
What conditions to impose; 115 and 3) In the case of an alleged violation, whether to revoke and
how much of the suspended sentence to re-impose. 116 The case involving the hypothetical
defendant in the Introduction illustrates points one and three. 117 With regard to point two, courts
have a lengthy menu of conditions from which to craft a probation order. 118 The menu includes
substance abuse and mental health treatment, 119 victim/community restitution, 120 restraints on
movement, 121 restraints on association, 122 community service, 123 and payment of family
support, 124 among others.
With few exceptions, 125 legal commentators tend to focus on the formal discretion courts
110
See infra notes 223-224 and discussion (summarizing empirical data); see also, Feicock, 485 U.S. at 640
(child support case in which probation was imposed). This is not just a hypothetical as many states do actually criminalize
failure to pay child support. See Rebecca May & Marguerite Roulet, A Look At Arrests Of Low-Income Fathers For Child
Support Nonpayment 13-38 (Jan. 2005) (summarizing various states’ approach).
111

See Feicock, 485 U.S. at 640 (child support case in which probation was imposed).

112

Turner echoed Bearden v. Georgia in requiring lower courts to make an affirmative finding that alleged
contemnors are financially able to pay whatever amount they have been enjoined to pay. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660, 668 (1983) (same for probation).
113

See, e.g., Logan, supra note 34, at 172; Horwitz, supra note 34, at 77.

114

See COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, §§ 2:2-2:4 (noting judicial discretion as to the combination of
probation and jail time).
115

See id. Legislatures rarely require the inclusion of specific conditions for specific offenses. See id. at §

116

See id.

117

See supra notes 20-22, 79 and discussion.

13:3.

118

See Logan, supra note 34, at 189 (noting the probation is one of the few sentencing options to survive
the attack on sentencing discretion in recent decades). Most jurisdictions require only that conditions be “reasonable.” See
Horwitz, supra note 34, at 91-100 (summarizing how courts have understood “reasonableness” in various jurisdictions).
119

COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, § 13:3, § 13:14.

120

Id. at § 11:1, § 11:9.

121

Id. at §§ 10:1-10:10. The range of restrictions is potentially quite broad including home detention. See
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1333 (2008) (discussing electronic monitoring). Might also
include prohibitions on being present in particular neighborhoods or parts of town. For example, probation for prostitution
offenses often entail a prohibition on entering so-called “prostitution zones.” See Sandra L. Moser, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1101, 1101-02 (2001).
122

COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, §§ 9:8-9:10.

123

See id. at § 10:22.

124

See id. at § 12:1.

125

See generally, Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences: Overincarceration and
the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOKLYN L. REV. 753 (2010) (exploring the consequences of probation’s overuse).
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enjoy and on the sensationalist excesses that such discretion sometimes enables. 126 For example,
so-called “shaming” conditions have generated considerably more scholarly and public attention
than probation generally. 127 But, shaming conditions are atypical. Nor do courts generally
exercise their discretion in totally idiosyncratic or unpredictable ways. In the vast majority of
cases, various factors (of which the law is just one) predict the conditions any court imposes. 128
The routine use of probation in mass justice contexts – i.e., their non-sensationalist everyday
application – generates individual and aggregate harms that have not been fully engaged by legal
scholars.
C. Punishment, Poverty, and Mass Justice
Over the last decade, sociologists have argued that the United States has substituted
criminal justice approaches for welfare approaches to poverty. 129 This scholarship provides a rich
account of the social motives driving criminal justice and welfare policy. These scholars,
however, do not identify the specific legal and institutional mechanisms through which these
processes occur. On the other hand, legal scholars who write about mass justice provide a detailed
view of institutional dynamics in mass justice courts. They do not, however, provide particularly
compelling accounts of the social and political motives animating these dynamics.
Sociologists have argued that American criminal justice policy is designed to contain and
subdue restive elements of the working classes. Loïc Waquant’s recent work on neoliberalism and
criminal justice is a particularly sharp example of the genre. In his book Punishing the Poor, he
argues that the United States has substituted punitive mechanisms for welfare mechanisms. 130 He
links the rampant increases in America’s incarceration rate with welfare reform in the late 1990s,
which curtailed the availability of public benefits to the poor. 131 Wacquant argues that the
dramatic spike in incarceration rates had nothing to do with reducing crime. 132 Similarly, welfare
126
See generally, Joanna Nairn, Is There A Right To Have Children? Substantive Due Process and
Probation Conditions that Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1 (2010) (focusing on
women sentenced as part of probation to avoid procreating); Horwitz, supra note 34, at 78 (explaining that appellate
review of probation conditions are highly deferential); see generally, Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, The Ideology of
Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges To Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 77
N.C. L. REV. 783 (1999) (showing courts that impose probation conditions that are intended to shame defendants).
127

See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 34, 144-49 (describing “shaming” conditions such as being forced to
publicize one’s own offense); Toni Masaro, The Meanings Of Shame Implications For Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 645, 690-91 (1997) (same).
128

MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 142-45 (1992).

129

See, e.g., WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41 (noting relation between criminal and welfare institutions);
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 201 (1990)
(analogizing welfare benefits to crime control to show both work “to forge a new social order in the conditions of late
modernity”); Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the
Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC. 43, 55 (2001) (showing how poorly funded welfare institutions are
correlated with crime rates); see also Ashley Rubin, Punitive Penal Preference and Support for Welfare: Applying The
“Governance Of Social Marginality” Thesis To The Individual Level, 13 PUNISHMENT & SOC. 198, 219-220 (2011)
(showing correlation between individuals who oppose welfare and individuals that support harsher punishment).
130

WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41.

131

See id. at 76-78.

132

Id. at 159; but see Bruce Western, Poverty Politics And Crime Control In Europe And America, 40
CONTEMP. SOC. 283, 285 (2011) (criticizing Wacquant’s argument oversimplifying the relationship between crime and
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reform had nothing to do with reducing poverty. 133
Wacquant attributes both hyper-incarceration and welfare reform to the rise of
“neoliberalism” in the United States. 134 Wacquant uses the expression pejoratively to refer to a set
of economic arrangements and a political sensibility that celebrate “the individual” and
“competition” in ways that systematically disadvantage the most vulnerable. 135 The rise of
neoliberalism has hastened states’ withdrawal from social welfare functions. 136 Correspondingly,
the State has amplified its punitive function, more aggressively punishing those who fall between
the now yawning cracks in the social safety net. 137 Those who once received welfare benefits are
the demographic doppelgangers of those who find themselves incarcerated. 138
Wacquant is not the first to draw the equation between welfare policy and criminal
justice. Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western have argued that penal and welfare institutions
should be understood as a “single policy regime” for dealing with the socially marginal. 139 David
Garland has described shifts in American criminal justice policy over the last two decades as
“penal welfarism.” 140 All this work builds on earlier sociology that recognized the extent to which
criminal justice mechanisms are used to manage the poor. 141 This is not because the poor commit
particularly serious crimes, but rather, because they appear disorderly or disruptive to the middleclass eye. 142
These accounts provide a rich account of penal policy’s consequences and the broad set
of socio-political motives that animate it. They do not, however, explain how courts (or specific
legal mechanisms) produce such consequences. On the other hand, scholars who write about
“mass justice” do the latter without doing the former.
I use the expression “mass justice” in an intuitive, colloquial sense to describe the style
of adjudication that prevails in specific, high-volume courts. 143 I use the expression to refer to
both particular institutions – e.g., South Carolina’s family courts; 144 and categories of cases – e.g.,
labor injunctions. 145 Mass-justice courts manage cases implicating matters of political salience –
incarceration).
133

WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 80.

134

Id. at xiii-xv, 20.

135

Id. at 5-6.

136

Id. at 80.

137

Id. at 98-99.

138

Id.

139

Beckett & Western, supra note 129, at 44.

140

GARLAND, supra note 129, at 186.

141

See JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL 1, 85 (1985); STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 107-09 (1985).
Cohen’s book in particular anticipates more contemporary work on crime and welfare. See id. at 44 (summarizing
arguments).
142
See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319, 336-37 (2004).
143

I am not the first to use the expression “mass justice.” See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory
Interpretation and Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 235 (2009) (using “mass justice” to describe
adjudication that occurs in administrative contexts); Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1289 (1975) (same).
144

See infra Section II.A.

145

See infra Section II.C. While mass justice courts tend to be state courts, it is not necessarily true. In the
case of labor injunctions, federal courts operated as mass justice courts. That federal courts could act in such a way is not
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e.g., crime and derelict parents – but have high caseloads such that no single case generates
particular public interest. Malcolm Feeley’s study of low-level criminal courts in 1979
Connecticut remains the shining example of scholarship on mass justice. While institutional
practice in mass justice institutions – particularly low-level criminal courts – remains
understudied by law scholars, there is a growing universe of work. 146
As described by Feeley, routinization and high caseloads make docket clearing an urgent
institutional priority. 147 The same holds for the institutional actors that appear in such courts –
particularly public defenders. 148 Docket clearing, in turn, impels summary processes and adaptive
mechanisms that privilege quick resolution over the values that ballast individualized justice:
accuracy and evenhandedness. 149 Many have decried the process as “assembly-line justice.” 150
That is, quick and mechanical disposition without rigorous fact finding. 151 This includes
disposition by agreement and/or summary process. 152 In the criminal context, the plea-based
system of adjudication is an example of disposition by agreement. 153 Mr. Turner’s family court
case, of course, is an example of summary disposition. 154
“Mass” has a double meaning, referring to both the courts’ caseloads and the
demographic profile of those appearing before them. Scholars writing about mass justice
acknowledge that those courts are populated by the politically and economically marginal. Highvolume criminal courts are a clear example. 155 As Turner illustrates, so too are family courts. 156 In
just a long-past historical fact either. See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CAL. L. REV. 481, 503 (2010) (describing mass processing of criminal reentry cases in federal courts in
Arizona).
146

See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315-16 (2011-12) (discussing
how the problems of mass justice in misdemeanor processing); Roberts, supra note 15, at 280 (describing how the “stories
of assembly-line representation in the lower courts have received little attention”).
147

FEELEY, supra note 128, at 270-72.

148

See Natapoff, supra note 146, at 1343.

149

Feeley, however, points out that we should not imagine judicial practice as having diverged from our
due process ideals at a moment in time. See FEELEY, supra note 128, at 268, 272-74.
150
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 391 (“Trials’ in many places, and for most defendants, had been
quick and dirty affairs, without lawyers and without much of the trappings of due process.”); Brief for Elizabeth G.
Patterson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 11, at *14; but see FEELEY, supra note 128, at 13 (criticizing
expression for being too simplistic).
151

See Natapoff, supra note 146, at 1345 (describing plea bargaining in misdemeanor cases).

152

See id.

153

See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 306-09 (describing the volume of cases in misdemeanor contexts
create an incentive to judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors to pursue guilty pleas); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 17,
at 391-93 (noting that resource constraints and crowded dockets have impelled plea bargaining in criminal courts).
154

See Brief for The Constitution Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 8, at *8,
(describing that Mr. Turner “spoke a total of 169 words at his hearing” and “received less than a minute of the court’s
time”).
155
See FEELEY, supra note 128, at xxii (stating criminal courts everywhere “are populated by the poor and
disadvantaged”). This fact has almost certainly been true for as long as there have been mass justice courts. See, e.g.,
Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 605-08 (1956) (describing how
Philadelphia criminal courts summarily handled vagrancy cases – “up to 1600 summary cases a month”). The universe of
non-residential parents subject to contempt are inordinately poor. See Brief for the Center for Family Policy and Practice
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *16-*23, Michael D. Turner, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 1010).
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the face of a heavy caseload, one surmises that judges might view incarceration as a quick and
effective tool for ascertaining whether someone like Mr. Turner could pay. 157 The broad
allowance for factual error in civil contempt gives courts considerable leeway to use detention in
this way. 158 Given these institutional dynamics, there is little reason to think that requiring an
express finding of ability to pay (as the Turner Court did) will make any difference: “making a
factual finding” would have required little more than a few additional marks on the pre-printed
family court order. 159
Legal scholars tend to cast the practices that prevail in mass justice settings as the
unintended byproduct of resource constraints and routinization. 160 Scholars, in fact, have
suggested that layering formal procedural protections over one another might entrench summary
justice rather than make it better. 161 Formal rules and institutional practices may very well exist in
ironic disjuncture. Bill Stuntz has, for example, argued that the development of robust criminal
procedure rights since the 1960s has made criminal trials more expensive and, as a consequence,
impelled plea bargaining and other summary processes to the detriment of defendants. 162 This
should sound a cautionary note for anyone proposing procedural fixes for mass justice’s
dysfunctions.
Scholars of mass justice readily concede that the poor and socially marginal crowd the
halls of mass justice institutions. 163 But, these scholars do not provide a particularly rich account
for why that is true. There is, in other words, a gap separating critical accounts like Wacquant’s
from legal scholarship about mass justice. The argument developed in Section II below helps fill
that gap.
II.

PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS

Punitive injunctions are a pervasive and defining mechanism within mass justice courts.
Millions are subject to such injunctions. 164 And hundreds of thousands are held in custody for
having violated them. 165 The concept of a “punitive injunction” developed herein helps identify
156

See Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2513-14.

157

See Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 11, at *13-*14.

158

See Oriel v. Prela, 49 S. Ct. 173, 174-75 (1929). The Oriel Court, in deciding a bankruptcy appeal,
approvingly quoted from a D.C. Circuit judge who characterized civil contempt as follows:
I have known a brief confinement to produce the money promptly, thus justifying the court’s
incredulity [regarding the contemnor’s claim that he could not pay], and I have also known it to fail.
Where it has failed, and where a reasonable interval of time has supplied the previous defect in the
evidence, and has made sufficiently certain what was doubtful before, name the [contemnor’s]
inability to obey the order, he has always been released, and . . . he would always have the right to
be released as soon as the fact becomes clear that he cannot obey.
Id. at 175 (quoting In re Epstein, 206 F. 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1913)).
159

See, e.g., Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2513 (showing the lack of findings by the judge about Mr. Turner’s ability

160

FEELEY, supra note 128, at 270-74.

161

See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2039 (2008).

162

Id. at 1978.

163

See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 128, at 4; Natapoff, supra note 146, at 8.

164

See infra notes 172-176, 223 and discussion.

165

See infra notes 174, 226-227 and discussion reviewing.

to pay).
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structural homologies across different areas of law and types of courts. In so doing, this Section
advances three related claims. First, it provides an account of the broad socio-political motives
that underlie mass justice. While punitive injunctions are frequently held out as promoting
individual agency and responsibility, they are used systematically against the economically and
socially marginal. This should not be understood as an unintended consequence or institutional
design flaw. Second, punitive injunctions lead to net widening and strengthening – they sweep
more people into custodial supervision and keep them there longer than would otherwise be true.
Third, when imposing and enforcing punitive injunctions, mass justice courts act in ways that
significantly deviate from our traditional understanding of the judicial function.
The injunctions at issue here are “punitive” to the extent that they fail to systematically
serve rehabilitative or remedial functions. This is true notwithstanding that, by official accounts,
such injunctions are supposed to promote individual agency and responsibility. For example,
Congress’s rationale for aggressively pursuing non-resident fathers for child support was remedial
– reimbursing the state for child-related welfare expenses. Progressive Era reformers offered
rehabilitation as the driving rationale for probation. Courts were supposed to leverage their
detention power to induce behavioral change that would, in turn, forestall future crime. Today, the
same rationale is offered for “innovations” in criminal justice such as drug, mental-health, and
other so-called “problem solving” courts.
In practice, these injunctions are used to manage the poor and socially marginal on a
population basis. Such injunctions are entered against individuals who are members of groups that
have, a priori, been cast as “disobedient.” “Disobedience” here is not a discrete legal fact. Rather,
it is shorthand for a shared set of judicial, political, and/or public assumptions about a particular
group’s antisocial proclivities. It is a sociological construct that reflects broad-based anxieties
about the underclass – so-called “problem populations” 166 or “dangerous classes.” 167 For example,
broadly shared class and race anxieties about “deadbeat dads” animated the changes in federal law
that prompted aggressive use of contempt actions against fathers like Mr. Turner. 168 Racial
anxiety about new immigrants and “the mentally deficient” fueled the rise of probation in the
early twentieth century. 169 As a historical matter, late nineteenth-century labor cases prefigured
today’s punitive injunctions. 170 So-called “labor injunctions” were impelled by partisan anxieties
about the restive working classes.
In operation, punitive injunctions lead to more individuals being swept up into what Loïc
Wacquant has called the carceral net. This is often (but not always) by policymakers’ express
design. Even when not by design, it is a sufficiently salient effect that it should not be thought of
as an unintended consequence. Punitive injunctions are typically roughly-hewn and of a one-sizefits-all nature. Historically, they have been entered against entire groups. 171 While that practice
does not prevail in contemporary family and criminal courts, punitive injunctions do typically
contain standardized features that are, quite often, demographically determined. Moreover, they
are often imposed reflexively without meaningful consideration for individuals’ ability to comply.
166
See GARLAND, supra note 31, at 129-30 (noting that class and power relations that prevail in society will
shape the understanding of who constitutes a “problem population”); see also RAFTER, supra note 31, at 84-85 (noting the
extent to which turn of the century criminal justice policy was explicitly population-based).
167

FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 102.

168

See infra notes 199-203 and discussion.

169

See infra notes 239-245 and accompanying text.

170

See infra notes 360-375 and accompanying text.

171

See infra Section II.C.
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Those subject to a punitive injunction are vulnerable to more summary forms of
detention than would otherwise be true. The procedural constraints limiting courts’ ability to
sanction for violating these injunctions is relaxed. This has both formal and informal dimensions.
Formally, procedural rules are relaxed when enforcing punitive injunctions: the burden of proof is
not beyond a reasonable doubt, court-appointed counsel is not constitutional required, and
evidentiary rules are relaxed. Informally, appellate review will typically be unavailable as a
practical matter. “Efficiency” is the rationale typically offered for relaxing these procedural
restraints. “Efficiency,” however, functions more as an apology for mass justice than as an
empirically verifiable claim about producing desirable outcomes cost-effectively.
Sections A and B below demonstrate that contempt orders like the one in Turner and
criminal probation are best understood as punitive injunctions. Section B also shows that much
lauded innovations in criminal justice, like “problem solving courts,” are best understood as
punitive injunctions. Section C sketches a historical context for punitive injunctions by analyzing
nineteenth-century labor injunctions. Finally, Section D concludes by suggesting that when
enforcing punitive injunctions, courts deviate quite dramatically from traditional understandings
of the judicial function.
A. Disciplining Deadbeat Dads
There are approximately twelve million outstanding child support orders in the United
States. 172 Of the more than seventy billion dollars that is owed pursuant to these orders, nearly
half of it is owed by fathers who earn less than twenty thousand dollars per year. 173 States use
incarceration as a debt collection device most aggressively against these indigent fathers. There is
astoundingly little quantitative information as to how many so-called “deadbeat dads” are in jail
or prison at any given time. One recent estimate put the number at as high as ninety thousand. 174
On its surface, Turner might seem like a straightforwardly remedial case – i.e., a
bounded legal dispute between parents who do not get along. 175 Most fathers in Mr. Turner’s
position, however, actually owe arrears to the state as opposed to the custodial parent. 176 This is
true because federal welfare reforms in the 1990s inaugurated an aggressive “collection agency”
approach to child support. 177 While the official policy rationale for welfare reform was promoting
individual responsibility, among its most significant effects has been expanding the carceral
dragnet for so-called “deadbeat dads.” 178 Courts use incarceration most aggressively against
172

Office of Child Support Enforcement, FY2009 Annual Report to Congress, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT at Fig. 2 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/fy2009-annual-report (last visited
Feb. 1, 2014).
173
Office of Child Support Enforcement, Understanding Child Support Debt: A Guide to Exploring Child
Support Debt In Your State 1, 5 (May 2004) available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/dcl_04_28a.pdf.
174
Douglas Galbi, Persons in Jail or in Prison for Child-Support Debt, PURPLE MOTES (Mar. 22, 2011),
purplemotes.net/2011/03/22/persons-in-jail-for-child-support-debt/.
175

See, e.g., Brief of Respondents, supra note 76, at 11 (“Mrs. Rogers grew impatient with petitioner’s
pattern of dilatory payments.”).
176

Patterson, supra note 108, at 99 (“Almost half the national child support debt is owed not to custodial
parents, but to the government.”).
177

Id. at 101.

178

See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at xviii, 79, 81, 103 (noting role of “moral individualism” and
“hegemonic market ideology” in accounting for welfare reform).
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economically marginal, non-custodial fathers like Mr. Turner. 179 Mr. Turner’s case is not out of
the ordinary. Family court orders accounted for up to 16% of those in South Carolina jails
between 2005 and 2009. 180
A child support order, like a custody order or any number of family court orders, is at
base an injunction. 181 It is not necessarily just an order to make future payments either. In Mr.
Turner’s case, he was variously ordered to obtain work and narcotics addiction treatment. 182
There is nothing new about family courts leveraging their power to detain in order to obtain
obedience from a non-custodial parent. 183 What is of recent vintage, however, is the intensive
expansion of the carceral net in order to advance an anti-welfare agenda. 184 More than three
decades of welfare reform have created powerful incentives for states to aggressively pursue noncustodial parents for child support. This change marks a broader political and social shift in the
United States from welfare-oriented to punitively oriented approaches to race and poverty. 185
Shifts in welfare law, which began in 1974 and culminated in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), have created a “super-collection
agency approach to child support enforcement.” 186 In 1974, Congress began building the child
support enforcement bureaucracy that exists today. 187 The 1974 amendments to the Social
Security Act required welfare recipients, as a condition for receiving state assistance, to cooperate
in establishing paternity and assign child support payments to the state. 188 Official debate about
cost-saving in public assistance has been tied to child support enforcement ever since. In the
1980s, Congress required states to establish paternity within specified time limits or risk reduction
in federal welfare transfers. 189 As part of the PRWORA in 1996, Congress transformed welfare
into a block-grant program and established strict limits on recipient eligibility. 190 Congress also
179
Patterson, supra note 108, at 118; see also SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN 80 (2003)
(describing demographic details of fathers of dependent children who receive welfare); Brief of Elizabeth G. Patterson and
South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 8 (inferring
from survey data that 75% of those held in contempt in South Carolina for violating child support order were indigent).
180
Brief of Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4.
181

Margaret M. Mahoney, The Enforcement of Child Custody Orders By Contempt Remedies, 68 U. PITT.
L. REV. 835, 836 (2007).
182

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 8, 10 (stating the order for child support required Mr. Turner
make weekly payments even though he was unemployed at the time; noting how a show cause order issued by the family
court led to suspension of a jail sentence in exchange for Mr. Turner’s completion of a drug treatment program).
183

See Buck v. Buck, 60 Ill. 105 (1871) (stating that contempt in child support cases is “carried on in a
shape of a criminal process for a contempt of authority of the court”).
184

See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and
Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 344-48 (2005).
185

See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41, 43, 58, 167-69.

186

Murphy, supra note 184, at 344-48.

187

See id. at 345.

188

Patterson, supra note 108, at 99, 101. In her compelling ethnographic work, Sharon Hays has
demonstrated the ways in which this requirement puts poor women in compromising, sometimes dangerous positions. See
HAYS, supra note 179, at 79, 81-82 (noting that nearly half of child support debt in the United States is owed to the
government).
189

Murphy, supra note 184, at 346. The current scheme is similar to the version in the 1980s. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 608 (a)(3)(A) (2006).
190

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2006) (refusing benefits for conditions such as being a teenager not
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required that states establish paternity for children with only one residential parent and to
routinize child support enforcement. 191 The PRWORA mandated that states create computerized
databases regarding child support orders and used mechanized collection tactics such as income
withholding, tax refund interception, or vehicle license revocation. 192 Where such enforcement
measures were once court ordered, the PRWORA streamlined their imposition by mandating that
they be carried out as administrative actions. 193 Federal law requires States to satisfy specified
performance benchmarks for establishing paternity and expediting child support collection. 194
Courts have become more involved in collecting child support from the poor as they
have become less involved in collecting it from the middle class. The mechanization of child
support has meant that there is less recourse to courts for those who earn wages or have readily
identifiable assets – i.e., middle class parents. 195 States use contempt most aggressively against
those without income or assets that can be targeted using automated collection techniques. 196 Of
course, this corresponds to the most economically marginal fathers like Mr. Turner. There is no
empirical evidence to suggest that this approach actually saves state resources, helps dependent
children, or helps custodial mothers. 197 But that was not likely the real point with regard to poor
fathers. The point was more likely to make a symbolic statement about the moral degeneracy of
that group. 198
The public, judges, and bureaucrats have been primed for the harsh treatment of child
support debtors by nearly three decades of “deadbeat dads” and anti-welfare rhetoric. The
deadbeat dad is equated with a criminal whose failure to pay child support is willful and
malevolent. 199 The expression found broad public traction in the years leading up to the
PRWORA’s passage and was used to dramatic effect by President Clinton. 200 The deadbeat dad
not only shortchanged his child, but to the extent that he was poor, also shortchanged the
taxpayer. Deadbeat dad rhetoric intersected with the racialized anti-welfare rhetoric that
characterized the entire political moment. 201 Politicians cast PRWORA as a response to the black
living under adult supervision or to teenagers that do not attend high school or other training programs).
191

See Murphy, supra note 184, at 345.

192

See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006) (specifying procedures States must adopt); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 654
(2006) (requiring States to develop capacity for automated data processing).
193
See 42 U.S.C. § 666(c)(1) (enumerating procedures for paternity determination and child support
collection that States must provide for without court order).
194

See 42 U.S.C § 652(g) (2006) (enumerating performance measures for States).

195

See Patterson, supra note 108, at 100, 105.

196

See id. at 101; see also Implementation of Welfare Reform and Child Support Enforcement: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong.182-83 (1996) (testimony
regarding different state practices using contempt in child support enforcement).
197
See HAYS, supra note 179, at 77 (noting that collections approach is not cost effective); Brief of
Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 11, at 24-27 (reviewing costs of detention in South Carolina).
198

See HAYS, supra note 179, at 77.

199

See id. at 76-77; Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY. L. &
POL’Y 127, 130, 130 n.11, 137 (2011). Related, Congress actually passed the “Deadbeat Parents’ Punishment Act of
1998,” criminalizing serious failures to pay child support across state lines. See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006) (requiring it
applies to any person who “willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child”).
200

See Cammett, supra note 199, at 141, 141 n.70.

201

See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41, 43, 58, 167-69.
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underclasses’ profligate sexuality and economic parasitism. 202 The “deadbeat dad” typified these
pathologies. 203
Mr. Turner’s incarceration exemplifies the institutional shifts that have occurred in
welfare law over the last thirty years. The State’s role in securing child support orders, the
persistence of arrears, and the aggressive use of contempt ensure that people like Mr. Turner will
revolve in and out of custody. 204 Rebecca Rogers, the mother of Mr. Turner’s child, assigned her
right to collect child support to South Carolina when she applied for welfare. 205 Once she had
done so, state institutions acted quickly to assign financial responsibility and collect on it. Upon
establishing Mr. Turner’s paternity, the South Carolina Department of Social Services moved for
a child support order in family court. 206 The family court required Mr. Turner to make payments
of $51.73 per week based on his “imputed” gross income of $1386 per month. 207 This
notwithstanding that the order listed Mr. Turner as “unemployed.” 208 The family court calculated
this obligation based on “imputed” income – the income level that the family court determined
Mr. Turner was capable of earning in a month – rather than Mr. Turner’s apparent income of
zero. 209 This, of course, meant that Mr. Turner had to obtain employment in order to comply with
the order. Earlier failures to comply on account of addiction issues also resulted in the family
court requiring that Mr. Turner enroll in drug treatment. 210 He was jailed when he failed to
comply with that condition. 211
The child support entered against Mr. Turner was retroactive to an earlier date, so that he
was in arrears from the moment the order was entered. 212 The arrears triggered orders to show
cause. The arrearage continued to mount even during the periods that Mr. Turner spent
incarcerated. 213 Pursuant to federal law, states cannot allow retroactive modification of child

202

See id. at 82-84; see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 191-93 (2009) (discussing
child custody); Steven M. Berezney, Zablocki Reborn?: The Constitutionality of Probation Conditions Prohibiting
Deadbeat and Abusive Fathers From Conceiving Children, 5 J.L. SOC. 255, 256 (2003) (discussing criminal cases in
which “deadbeat dads” were put on probationary sentence that included a condition limiting freedom to reproduce).
203

See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 84; see also SIMON, supra note 202 (discussing child custody);
Berezney, supra note 202 (discussing criminal cases in which “deadbeat dads” were put on probationary sentence that
included a condition limiting freedom to reproduce).
204

It is not just men who are vulnerable to punitive injunctions. See infra notes 318-320 and discussion.

205

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 8.

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.; see also Cammett, supra note 199, at 142-43 (noting court practice of imputing income in child
support cases and setting child support amounts in absentia); Patterson, supra note 108, at 108-09 (also noting court
practice of imputing income in child support cases and setting child support amounts in absentia).
210

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *15 n.10.

211

Id.

212

Id. at *9.

213

Id. at *10. The arrearage also mounted during those periods that Mr. Turner was incarcerated for
unrelated criminal charges. Id. at *11; see also NANCY THOENNES, CTR. FOR POL’Y RES., CHILD SUPPORT PROFILE
MASSACHUSETTS INCARCERATED AND PAROLED PARENTS, FATHERS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN MASSACHUSETTS, 2429 (May 2002).
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support orders. 214 This means that someone like Mr. Turner cannot erase past arrearage that is
based on an unrealistic (or simply incorrect) level of imputed income. Absent some dramatic
change in his economic fortunes, Mr. Turner will be in debt forever. He can realistically expect to
spend more time in jail than he already has. 215 At least one commentator has described this cycle
of arrearage and incarceration as “the silent return of the debtor’s prison.” 216
The Turner Court, essentially, mandated that contempt proceedings for child support
conform to the strictures required in probation hearings. That seems intuitive enough given that
criminal and family courts use detention to manage substantially overlapping demographic
groups. 217 The Court held that the state need not provide counsel, but must provide alternative
procedures to determine whether to detain an individual who is unable to pay. 218 The Court, in
essence, treated the proceeding in Turner as the constitutional equivalent of a probation
revocation. 219 The parallel was apropos given that a number of states criminalize failure to pay
child support. 220
B. Injunctions Not to Sin 221
1. Probation
Probation allows courts to sweep more people into the criminal justice system and keep
them there for longer than would likely occur otherwise. Probation is among the most common
sentences meted out. 222 Numbering almost five million, probationers are the largest segment of
214

See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C); see also Cammett, supra note 199, at 148-49 (discussing elements of the
federal law prohibiting states from retroactively modifying judgments cannot be retroactively).
215

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011).

216

See Patterson, supra note 108, at 95. While it is difficult to say precisely how many individuals find
themselves in Mr. Turner’s position, it is safe to think the number is quite high. Id. at 117-18; see also Galbi, supra note
174.
217
See Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 11, at *5; see
also Brief of Center for Family Policy and Practice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 155, at *16-*23;
Cammett, supra note 199, at 153-54 (noting relationship between mass criminal incarceration and child support arrears).
218

See Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2512.

219

See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983) (must be finding of ability to pay where payment
of sum is part of probation condition); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788-90 (1973) (finding that counsel is not
required in probation revocation).
220
See Feiock, 485 U.S. at 639-40 (example of child support case in which probation was imposed). This is
not just a hypothetical as many states do actually criminalize failure to pay child support. See May & Roulet, supra note
110, at 13-38 (summarizing state-by-state findings on state and local arresting practices for nonpayment of child support).
221
See Arthur W. Towne, Probation & Suspended Sentence, 7 J. AM. INSTITUTION CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 654, 664 (1917).
222
In 2006, 46.2% of state felony cases included some term of probation. See United States Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Judicial Reporting Program, Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2006) (last visited Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/ssvd/studies/27701/datasets/0001/variables/V8?paging.startRow=126. There is no national data available
for probation in the misdemeanor context. There is, however, data available for at least some individual states and
municipalities. For example, in New York City in 2012, 32.7% of those accused of misdemeanors were subject to courtordered conditions. See, e.g., New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York City Adult Arrests
Disposed (Apr. 2012), Computerized Criminal History System (last visited Feb 1, 2014), available at http://www.criminal
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those serving criminal sentences in the United States. 223 This holds most true in lower criminal
courts where, in some jurisdictions, probation might appear as a part of most sentences. 224 There
are fewer procedural hurdles to jailing a probationer than non-probationer. 225 This fact combined
with its pervasiveness means that “probation revocations” account for a substantial portion of new
admissions to jails and prisons. 226 Again, the proportion will often be even higher in low-level
criminal courts for which data is not centrally collected, if at all. 227 It is the poor and minorities
who find themselves disproportionately caught in the wider and stronger penal net that probation
helps create. 228
Probation is an “injunction not to sin” that is entered in lieu of incarceration; that is, a
defendant’s jail sentence is “suspended” pending completion of the conditions specified in the

justice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nyc.pdf. Such conditions were imposed as part of a sentence following conviction,
either in the form of “probation” or “conditional release.” See N.Y. Penal Law § 65.05 (defining “conditional release”).
Alternatively such conditions were imposed as part of an arrangement in which compliance would culminate in the
criminal charges being dismissed after a specified period of time – i.e., the case was “adjourned in contemplation of
dismissal” (ACD). See N.Y. C.P.L. § 170.56. The discussion in this Section and throughout uses the term “probation”
generically to describe court-ordered conditions imposed in connection with a criminal case. As the New York City
example suggests such conditions are not always termed “probation.”
223
See Lauren E. Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United States, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf.
224
See Tamara Flinchum et al., Structured Sentencing Statistical Report for Felonies and Misdemeanors,
NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMMISSION, Fiscal Year 2008/09 51 (March 2010), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/statisticalrpt_fy0809R.pdf (80% of misdemeanor
sentences in North Carolina include probation); Denise Leifker & Lisa L. Sample, Probation Recommendations and
Sentences Received: The Association Between the Two and the Factors That Affect Recommendations, 22 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 494, 503 (2011) (showing that 92.4% of sentences included probation in California jurisdiction studied).
225

See infra notes 280-285 and discussion.

226

Precise data is difficult to come by. From data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, however, it
appears that roughly 18% of prison admissions in 2006 were for probation violations. I arrived at that number by dividing
the number of probationers who were admitted on their original charge (128,969) by total prison admissions (730,860).
LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009 25 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus09.pdf; HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J.
SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009 4 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p09.pdf. Because it does not include admissions to jails, this figure likely understates by a good bit the number of
revocation-based admissions by a significant amount. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME &
JUST. 149, 166 (1997) (citing study that demonstrated 30-50% revocation-based admission rate in the 1990s).
227

See, e.g., LINDA FREEMAN, NEW MEXICO SENTENCING COMMISSION, LENGTH OF STAY IN DETENTION
FACILITIES: A PROFILE OF SEVEN NEW MEXICO COUNTIES 3 (2012), available at http://nmsc.unm.edu/reports/2012/finalupdate-length-of-stay.pdf, (noting that 18.1% of county jail bookings were for probation violations); THOMAS BLOMBERG
ET AL., CENTER FOR CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, BROWARD COUNTY JAIL POPULATION TRENDS AND
FORECAST 26 (2010), available at http://www.criminologycenter.fsu.edu/p/pdf/pretrial/Broward%20Co.%20Jail%20
Population%20Forecast%202010.pdf (report found that in 36.4% of admissions to county jail, probation violation was
most serious charge); Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee: Final Report, 2006 Leg., 123rd Sess. 12 (Me. 2006),
available at http://www.maine.gov/corrections/caac/CAACFinalReport.pdf (noting that 60% of new admission to county
jails was for probation violations). Even when data are available for probation-revocation-based jail admissions, they will
often understate the phenomenon. For a partial explanation as to why, see infra note 277.
228
See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41, 43, 58, 69-70, 167-69, 197 (describing predominance of blacks in
prison since 1980s).
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injunction. 229 As conceived by Progressive Era reformers, probation was supposed to allow courts
to leverage their punitive power to rehabilitate offenders and forestall future harm. 230 Progressive
Era reformers advanced probation as a corrective measure for the overly formalist, harsh justice
that prevailed in the nineteenth-century. 231 Reformers criticized the penal regime’s harshness on
utilitarian grounds. They argued that incarceration often succeeded in doing little more than
creating criminals – the harshness of penal institutions combined with the opportunity to network
consolidated detainees’ incentives to commit crimes. 232 Reformers viewed probation as part of a
broader shift towards a penal ethos of rehabilitation. 233 Criminal conviction was a strategic
opportunity to shape reformable convicts’ future behavior. 234 By applying a calibrated sequence
of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks,’ probation would incrementally cajole (and coerce) convicts into
conforming to societal norms. 235
Despite Progressive Era reformers’ emphasis on individualization and rehabilitation, 236
probation functioned as a population-based, disciplinary technique from early on. 237 Many
Progressives did not view the destitute and marginal people who were the objects of their interests
as full-fledged individuals. 238During the Progressive era when probation was born, it was
common for criminal justice policy makers to use the expression “criminal class” to encompass
all lower classes. 239 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the United States witnessed rampant
industrialization and mass immigration. 240 The throngs of new immigrants that crowded the
laboring classes alarmed Progressive Era reformers just as much as they did the Protestant middle
class. 241 For all of their faith in science’s capacity to fix social problems, Progressive Era

229

See COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, § 1:1, at 1-3.

230

See DAVID J. ROTHMAN CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 6 (2002).

231

See id. at 18-23, 43, 68 (noting harshness and inflexibility of penal institutions in nineteenth-century).
Offense category determined the sentence without regard of individual circumstances. Id.
232
See id.; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 265-67 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (noting that criticism that prison created criminals was coterminous
with creation of prison itself).
233

See COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, § 1:5 (noting rehabilitation as the primary theory animating

probation).
234
Progressive Era reformers believed that trained experts should collect extensive personal information
about offenders so that individualized treatment could be crafted. See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 63-64.
235

See Towne, supra note 221, at 660-62 (noting the difficulty of breaking “bad habits”); see also
FOUCAULT, supra note 232, at 128 (“The apparatus of corrective penalty . . . must rest on a studied manipulation of the
individual.”).
236
See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 59; see SHELDON E. GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 101 (Sheldon Glueck eds., 1933).
237
See, e.g., LEWIS E. MACBRAYNE & JAMES P. RAMSAY, ONE MORE CHANCE 331 (1916) (noting that is
the “class” of “accidental and occasional offenders” who are most likely to be reformed through probation).
238

See RAFTER, supra note 31, at 119.

239

Id. at 118-19.

240

Id. at 57, 157.

241

The foreign born and their progeny crowded the ranks of the laboring classes and incarcerated. See
ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 23 (discussing nineteenth century penitentiary in Illinois); see also GARLAND, supra note
31, at 150 (noting that Foucaultian theory helps understand relationship between discourses on criminality and social
control of laboring classes).
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reformers were as enmeshed in social hierarchy as those they criticized. 242 Both the right and left
conceived of the new, lower classes as predisposed towards disobedience and criminality.
In the burgeoning field of criminology, Progressive Era writers were quick to ascribe
these qualities to biological defectiveness. 243 The need to manage these so-called defects impelled
tectonic shifts in criminal justice beginning in the late nineteenth century. Fundamentally,
Progressives advocated treating defendants for who they were as opposed to what they had
done. 244 This was an attractive idea to judges and to other criminal justice personnel who were
confronted with a more racially heterogeneous universe of defendants with each passing year. 245
Even in theory, “individualization” was a metaphor for population-based control.
Probation’s proponents argued that courts should rely on actuarial prediction and new taxonomies
of mental defectiveness. 246 “Individualization” required culling and sorting criminals into
categories based on the probability of recidivism. Probation was supposed to be reserved for those
criminals who would be most susceptible to reconditioning. 247 Many reformers believed that
likely recidivists should be denied probation, perhaps even detained indefinitely, regardless of
how minor the underlying offense. 248 In this vein, reformers devised various predictive techniques
to distinguish “re-formable” criminals from “born” ones. 249 Probation was reserved for the former
group alone. 250 Of course, constructing a comprehensive psycho-social profile of every criminal
defendant would have been impossible then, just as it is now. 251 Thus, reformers devised various
“actuarial” techniques to identify the presence or absence of demographic and psychiatric indicia
thought to predict recidivism; early examples of such indicia included paternal race and criminal
history. 252
From its inception, probation likely contributed to net widening in mass justice courts. 253
First, it created more latitude to impose a criminal sentences in marginal cases. 254 Criminal-court
judges quickly took to probation as a tool for managing their dockets. 255 Probation allowed courts
242

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 1, 6, 8, 10 (describing Progressive Era reformers as optimistic
reformers who were interested in “curing” crime, but failed to recognize that criminal justice institutions applied the
reformers’ discretion-enhancing reforms in a manner that was inconsistent with reformers’ idealistic vision); see also
RAFTER, supra note 31, at 133-34 (suggesting that Progressives’ “energetic liberal reforms” helped fuel eugenics in the
United States).
243

RAFTER, supra note 31, at 157.

244

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 77, 103-4.

245

See id. (noting extent to which immigration had altered demographic profile of criminal defendants).

246

See RAFTER, supra note 31, at 151.

247

See id.

248

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 63, 71-72 (noting reformers’ view that recidivists should not be
eligible for probation and the importance of indeterminate sentencing).
249

Id. at 58 (noting Progressives’ use of Cesare Lombroso’s theory of “born criminals”); see also RAFTER,
supra note 31, at 123 (also noting the same).
250

See RAFTER, supra note 31, at 123-24.

251

Cf. Logan, supra note 34, at 178, 178 n.29.

252

BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL

AGE 110 (2009).
253

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 108-10 (describing early judicial practices of imposing probation on
petty criminals who, absent probation, might not have received any punishment at all).
254

See id.

255

See, e.g, Logan, supra note 34, at 178; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 70-71, 78 (explaining the
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to quickly convict and sentence without contributing to jail congestion, at least not in the first
instance. 256 There were numerous jurisdictions where judges granted probation liberally in minor
cases. 257 Absent probation, in any number of marginal cases, judges might very well have
imposed no sentence at all. 258 This has remained a persistent feature of probation in mass justice
courts. For example, Malcolm Feeley observed this in the Connecticut criminal courts in the
1970s. 259 Other sociologists have recognized net widening as a salient consequence of probation
and intermediate sanctions generally. 260 Likely because of its attractiveness to judges and other
criminal justice personnel, probation proliferated rapidly. By 1915, 25 states had probation laws
and, 261 by 1956, virtually all states did. 262 Early in the twentieth century, probationers came to
outnumber those in detention. 263 That remains true today. 264
Individualization certainly does not occur in mass justice courts today. 265 Probation
orders are, more often than not, of the cookie-cutter variety. 266 Prosecutors play a substantial role
advantages of indeterminate sentencing, specifically the implementation of probation, as seen by early Progressives);
Maurice Vanstone, The International Origins and Initial Development of Probation: An Early Example of Policy Transfer,
48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 735, 746 (2008) (considering the cost-efficiency of probation); FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at
391 (noting probation’s role in facilitating plea bargaining in early twentieth century).
256

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 102, 110.

257

See id. at 102 (stating that judges had broad discretion to grant probation as they “saw fit”); see also
Towne, supra note 221, at 663-64 (noting that an initial goal of probation was to “sav[e] offenders from the full severity of
the law”).
258

ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 110; Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community
Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POLICY 51, 56-57 (2013) (summarizing sociological literature
documenting probation’s net-widening effects).
259

FEELEY, supra note 128, at 69 (quoting criminal court judge).

260

See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 CRIME & JUST. 199, 200
(1998) (discussing the growing number people in prison post-federal guidelines, which urged for more jail time for certain
offenses).
261

MACBRAYNE & RAMSEY, supra note 237, at 328.

262

ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS, AND PROBATION 68 (2d
ed. 1997) (noting that all contiguous states adopted probation by 1956, with Alaska and Hawaii following soon thereafter).
263
Logan, supra note 34, at 178. In the 1990s, 30 to 50% of prison admissions were for probation
revocation. Petersilia, supra note 226, at 166.
264
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately 1 in every 48 adults in the United States
was on probation or parole in 2010, compared to about 1 in every 104 adults in custody. GLAZE & BONCZAR, supra note
226, at 2.
265
See supra notes 247, 263 and accompanying text; see also Rodney Kingsnorth et al., Criminal
Sentencing and the Court Probation Office: The Myth of Individualized Justice Revisited, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 255, 269 (1999)
(arguing against the “myth of individualized justice”). In theory, court-appointed probation officers were supposed to
make individualized recommendations to judges to help individualize sentences. Id. at 271 (referring to the initial role of
probation officers as that of “agent of individualization”). In practice, however, probation officers tend to function as
agents of the state and are often harsher than prosecutors. Id. at 268 (studying one jurisdiction and finding that when
probationers disagree with the negotiated plea it is “almost three times more likely to be in a punitive rather than in a
lenient direction”). In some jurisdictions, however, the function of a probation office does not remotely approximate even
this level of individual review. In Georgia, for example, probation offices have been privatized and “act essentially as
collection agencies.” Profiting From the Poor: A Report on Predatory Probation Companies in Georgia, THE LAW
OFFICE OF THE SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, (July 2008) 1, 2, http://www.schr.org/files/profit_from_poor.pdf.
266

See ROTHMAN, supra note 230, at 108-10 (noting that from early on, judges have applied probation in a
rote, one-size-fits-all manner rather than in the individualized manner that reformers had advocated for).
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in determining what the probation conditions will be for any given offense – e.g., plea agreements
typically contain prosecutorial recommendations regarding probation. 267 In most jurisdictions,
judges will be all too willing to impose the recommended sentence. 268 That recommendation will
rarely be rigorously individualized. 269 Courts tend to impose conditions that are determined by
nature of the charges. 270 For someone convicted of a minor drug and theft offense, like the
hypothetical defendant from the introduction, probation conditions may include paying restitution,
drug treatment, and drug testing conditions. 271 A judge is very unlikely to probe the life
circumstances impelling such a defendant to commit criminal acts and tailor treatment
accordingly. Even if she were inclined to do so, there is an incredible scarcity of rehabilitation
resources available for criminal defendants – particularly when one considers the complex socioeconomic factors that produce the poverty that besets those who are caught up in the criminal
justice system.
In addition to net widening, probation also contributes to net strengthening – i.e., it keeps
people “in the system” for longer. 272 Probation revocations account for a substantial portion of
admissions to jail and prison. 273 For many, probation is less an alternative to incarceration and
more just a deferral of incarceration. There are almost certainly large numbers of individuals who
spend more time detained for probation violations than they would have had they simply received
a fixed term jail sentence upon conviction. 274
There are two reasons why any given individual might spend more time in the criminal
justice web as a result of probation. First, to the extent that probation is in lieu of a jail sentence,
the jail sentence remains “suspended.” 275 A judge may impose any portion of that suspended
sentence upon finding that a probationer has violated the terms of his probation. 276 The judge is
free to re-impose the probation conditions upon the individual’s release – and, of course, whatever
balance of the suspended sentence remains will continue to hang over his head. 277
267

This dynamic has existed from the earliest moments in probation’s history. See id. at 78.

268

See Russell Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1237, 1267 (2008).
269

See id.

270

COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, § 10:7; see also Moser, supra note 121, at 1101 (describing practice in
Florida); Maine Report, supra note 227, at 22 (describing practice in Maine).
271

COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, §§ 1.1, 13.3.

272

See Horwitz, supra note 125, at 765-66 (explaining how probationers who violate conditions of
probation are often incarcerated for long periods of time).
273

Supra notes 229-230.

274

Horwitz, supra note 125, at 765-66. It is extraordinarily difficult to say precisely how many individuals.

Infra note 277.
275

See supra notes 78-83 and discussion.

276

Id.

277

It is difficult to make accurate quantitative claims about the frequency of jail admissions for probation
revocations because institutions are not always consistent in how they record data. See VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY JAIL OVERCROWDING REDUCTION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT: REVISED 111 (Sept. 2011) i, xxiv. http://
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LA_County_Jail_Overcrowding_Reduction_Report.pdf (discussing
the difficulty in analyzing non-felony booking because of the lack of accurate and available data). An admission
precipitated by probation violation might be recorded as such. Id. Alternatively, it might be recorded as an admission for
the underlying criminal case in which probation was imposed. Id. If the latter occurs with regularity in a particular system,
jail admissions precipitated by probation violations will be greatly understated. Id.
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Returning to the hypothetical defendant from the Introduction, he is likely to be subject
to both periodic drug testing and treatment conditions. 278 Assume that each of his misdemeanor
crimes is punishable by a maximum of one-year in jail. Further assume that, if forced to impose
detention upon sentencing (with no probation), a judge would have sentenced the defendant to one
month in jail. 279 Now assume, in lieu of detention, the judge imposed one year of probation with a
one-year suspended sentence. Each time the defendant violates a probation condition, a judge can
impose any portion of that one-year suspended sentence. If a judge takes probation violations very
seriously or there are a number of violations, one could readily imagine the defendant spending
more than a month in detention during the period that the court has jurisdiction over him. If the
court does not credit the defendant’s time in jail towards the probationary term and, upon the
defendant’s release, re-imposes whatever balance of the probationary term remains, the defendant
will certainly remain “in the system” for longer than one year.
The second reason probationers are likely to get stuck in the penal net for longer is
because they are more vulnerable to new convictions than they otherwise would be. 280 Virtually
all probation orders include a condition not to commit any “new criminal law violations”
(NCLV). 281 The limited procedural protection afforded in revocation proceedings amplifies
prosecutorial leverage to obtain new convictions when the proposed revocation is based on
violation of an NCLV condition. 282 Prosecutors have three choices regarding a probationer they
believe has committed a new criminal law violation: move for revocation, move for contempt, or
file a new criminal charge. Obtaining a conviction for criminal contempt may preclude conviction
for the underlying crime on double jeopardy grounds. 283 Probation revocation, however, does not
have the same preclusive effect. 284 Accordingly, there is powerful incentive for states to both
move for revocation and file new criminal charges.
Moving for revocation increases that state’s strategic leverage in plea negotiations for the
new criminal charge because proving a probation violation is easier than proving guilt in a
criminal trial – i.e., the state would agree to withdraw the revocation motion in exchange for a
plea of guilty on the new criminal charge. 285 For example, returning to our hypothetical
defendant: while on probation, assume that he is arrested for engaging in a new theft. The

278

See supra notes 20-22, 79, 271 and discussion.

279

The example is for purely illustrative purposes. The underlying intuition behind the example is simply
that a judge in a crowded urban or suburban court is very unlikely to impose the statutory maximum for a relatively minor
crime. Rather, she is likely to impose a relatively lenient sentence. FEELEY, supra note 128, at 3 (noting that low-level
courts tend toward leniency).
280
The relationship between probation and plea bargaining is a longstanding one. See ROTHMAN, supra
note 241, at 98-101 (noting that from the early twentieth century, probation has been a tool to induce pleas, not to provide
individualized treatment).
281
See COHEN Volume 1, supra note 21, § 8:1; see also TONY FABELO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
COUNCIL, TRENDS, PROFILE AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO FELONY PROBATION REVOCATIONS IN TEXAS, (May 2002) i
(59% of felony probation revocations in Texas during the period under study were for new criminal law violations) http://
www.lbb.state.tx.us/Public_Safety_Criminal_Justice/Reports/felpro2.pdf.
282

See Horwitz, supra note 125, at 766-71.

283

See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697-99 (plurality opinion).

284

Horwitz, supra note 125, at 783-84.

285

See id. at 784-85; see also Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining,
and the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 435 (2011) (arguing that the de facto standard of proof in
criminal cases is lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” for repeat offenders).
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prosecutor is now well-positioned to extract a plea on the new theft charge, even if the case is
factually weak. The prosecutor will threaten to move for revocation based on the NCLV condition
if the defendant does not plead guilty to the new charge. Because the procedural hurdles are lower
for probation revocation than for a new criminal conviction, the defendant will plead more
readily. The sentence for the new theft charge is likely to include a new term of probation.
The “revolving door” phenomenon in criminal justice may be less about criminals’
pathology than just a predictable consequence of net widening and strengthening. Any population
subject to intensive policing/prosecution will regularly move between supervised release and
incarceration over time. Of course, it is the poor and urban minorities that are subject to the most
intensive forms of policing. 286
2. “Problem-Solving Courts”
For many, “problem-solving courts” represent an innovative method of leveraging
courts’ coercive power to induce behavioral change. The approach is roughly analogous to
probation. Accordingly, one ought to view problem-solving courts skeptically. 287
The history of problem-solving courts mirrors that of probation. Pioneered in the late
1980s, judges have led the problem-solving court movement. 288 Much as with probation’s early
history, deterrence and docket management concerns have impelled the movement. 289 In theory –
and again, much like probation – problem-solving courts use a “therapeutic model” to rehabilitate
offenders. 290 They are open to those offenders the court deems most amenable to rehabilitation.
Such courts have been created to address any number of “problem populations,” 291 but drug
courts are the most common. 292 Admission may require a plea of guilt, or the functional
equivalent. 293 In exchange for remaining out of jail, participants are required to comply with
various conditions, most significantly those relating to treatment. 294
The most significant difference between probation and problem solving courts is that, in
the latter, judges play an active role administering therapeutic conditions. 295 Participants must

286

See Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1173-74 (2011).

287

More than twenty years ago, Stanley Cohen warned of the net-widening and net-strengthening
implications of new, ostensibly rehabilitative, criminal justice institutions. See COHEN, supra note 141, at 44, 49. For more
general, recent criticism of problem-solving courts, see Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and
Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law. 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1591 (2012); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55
UCLA L. REV. 783, 786 (2008).
288

See McLeod, supra note 287, at 1605.

289

Id. at 422-23; see also Rekha Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy: Problem-Solving Courts and the
Deliberative Democratic State, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 855 (2008).
290

See Eric Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 425 (2009).

291

See Mirchandani, supra note 289, at 853-54 (describing types of social problems).

292

Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts And the Impending
Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2004).
293

See id. at 1482. Criteria usually pertain to the individual’s criminal history and the nature of the charged
offense. See id at 1481.
294

Id at 1482.

295

Id. at 1462 (discussing “problem-solving courts” such as drug courts, in which the judge plays a role in
treating participants).
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regularly appear in court and report on their progress. 296 Those proceedings are not adversarial.
Typically, hearings are “collaborative:” judges, prosecutors, social workers, and defense counsel
are supposed to work together to ensure compliance. 297 While judges have considerable discretion
to oust participants and impose jail time, they are only supposed to do so when it is clear that a
participant is not amenable to rehabilitation. 298 Drug courts, for example, are supposed to tolerate
the occasional relapse. 299 That problem-solving courts are cut of the same philosophical cloth as
probation, 300 might explain why they have proliferated so quickly. 301 The movement finds
considerable support across the political spectrum and has been heralded as an important part of
the solution to mass incarceration. 302
The problem-solving courts’ limitations are similar to probation’s. For example, the
defendants who are most readily offered admission to drug courts are those with no prior criminal
records who have been arrested for relatively minor drug crimes. 303 These are the same kind of
minor cases that, in crowded jurisdictions, might not have been seriously pursued at all. For those
defendants who have serious addiction issues, being admitted to drug court may very well extend
the time that they remain “in the system.” Data for New York City courts suggest the extent to
which such individuals fail to satisfy the conditions imposed upon them by drug courts. 304 Such
failures often garner longer spells of detention than would likely have been imposed if fixed term
detention were imposed in the first instance. 305
In some problem-solving courts, family law and criminal law quite literally intersect. For
example, in 2001, New York created Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) courts that roll criminal
and family court functions into one. 306 IDV courts are supposed to efficiently manage the issues
that beset families where domestic violence has occurred. Part of what “efficient management”
entails is more intensive and consistent monitoring of offenders – i.e., avoiding the conflicts and
gaps created by a piecemeal approach. 307 IDV courts are built on a model of punitive injunction
that has long-defined pre-trial release in domestic violence cases.
Courts typically enjoy discretion to impose conditions upon defendants released from
296

See John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the Nature and Limitations of
Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 97, 104, 113 n.67 (2007).
297
The “collaboration” begins to look less therapeutic if any individual consistently fails to satisfy the
conditions of release.
298

See Casey, supra note 292, at 1482.

299

See id.

300

See Bozza, supra note 296, at 104, 140 (noting probation departments are similar to and capable of
functioning like problem-solving courts); Casey, supra note 292, at 1480 (identifying reasons for proliferation of drug
courts).
301

See supra notes 255, 263 and accompanying text.

302

See Miller, supra note 290, at 428 (discussing drug courts). Miller suggests that this may be because
supporting drug courts allow policy-makers to present themselves as supporting reform without requiring an “explicit
discussion” of the class and race consequences of narcotics enforcement. Id.
303

See Bowers, supra note 287, at 798.

304

Id. at 786.

305

Id.

306

See Integrated Domestic Violence Courts Overview, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
problem_solving/idv/home.shtml (last visited Feb 1, 2014).
307
See Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving Courts: Models and Trends, 26 JUST. SYS.
J. 35, 38-39 (2005).
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custody pending trial. 308 Those conditions bear considerable similarity to those courts might
impose as part of probation. 309 For example, no-contact orders (NCOs) are stock pre-trial
conditions of release in domestic violence cases. 310 Typically, NCOs forbid any contact
whatsoever with the alleged victim and also forbid presence in a shared dwelling. 311 NCOs are
premised on the assumption that an alleged batterer’s presence in the home creates a high risk of
DV assault. 312 Once established that the defendant is a member of a disobedient population
(“batterers”), 313 behavior that would “ordinarily [be] innocent” is taken as the prelude to
violence. 314 Most jurisdictions criminalize the violation of NCOs – i.e., should a defendant violate
an NCO, the state could file a new criminal law charge or move for contempt. 315 Demonstrating
presence in a shared dwelling (in violation of NCO) is, of course, easier than proving assault,
particularly if the alleged victim elects no to cooperate with the prosecution. 316 The NCO, in other
words, makes it easier to obtain a conviction of alleged batterers than would otherwise be
possible.
This style of punitive injunction has proliferated to other mass justice courts, principally
family courts. While initially justified as a technique for managing sexist violence in romantic
relationships, 317 courts began applying NCOs in cases involving other intimate relationships –
e.g., parent-child relationships. 318 Now, criminal and family courts routinely issue NCOs against
parents in child neglect cases. 319 The irony, of course, is that, in this context, NCOs are typically
issued against women, not for their protection. 320
C. Taming Workers
“Labor injunctions” in the late nineteenth century were a historical precursor of the
contemporary punitive injunctions discussed above. Labor injunctions dramatically expanded the
ancient equity power of the private injunction. Courts used labor injunctions in tandem with
indirect contempt sanctions to intervene frequently and aggressively in labor disputes. 321 Net
308

See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 92 (2013).

309

See id. § 48.

310

See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 16 (2006) (arguing that use of NCOs in
misdemeanor DV cases has shifted the political and social meaning of the home). This should not be confused with a civil
NCO obtained by the putative victim herself. See David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman, The Use of
Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1190-97 (1995) (arguing in favor
of victim-initiated civil NCOs backed by contempt as opposed to police-initiated criminal action).
311

See Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40
B.C. L. REV. 937, 946-47 (1999).
312

See Suk, supra note 310, at 19-21.

313

See id. at 20.

314

See id. at 22.

315

See id. at 16-17; see also supra notes 280-285 and accompanying text.

316

Complaining witnesses often refuse to cooperate with the prosecution in DV cases. See id at 19.

317

See David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and Their Impact On
Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1457, 1461 (2010).
318

See id. at 1447; Mahoney, supra note 181, at 836 (noting that custody order is an injunction).

319

See Jaros, supra note 317, at 1457-58 (detailing practice in New York State).

320

See id at 1457.

321

See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW & THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 60-62 (1991).
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widening was the labor injunction’s express purpose. 322 Prevailing biases about the unruly,
working classes impelled punitive injunction’s development in the labor context. 323 Critics called
the new practice “government by injunction.” 324
The emergence of large-scale labor organizing and protest in the late nineteenth century
made criminal convictions an unlikely device for social control. Prior to labor injunction’s advent,
states had prosecuted union leaders and members as criminal co-conspirators. 325 Such cases were
episodic and decidedly local in nature, much like the labor movement itself was during the early
nineteenth century. 326 Following the civil war, there was a dramatic expansion of industrial and
commercial enterprise in the United States. The same period also witnessed the intensive
concentration of industrial capital. Goliath enterprises came to dominate entire industries. These
entities were not specific to particular cities or even states. There was corresponding growth in
unionization during the, so-called, Gilded Age. 327 Workers’ organizations not only grew, they
collaborated with one another in challenging large-scale enterprise. 328 The famous Pullman strike
is a good example. Employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company, based in the company town
of Pullman, Illinois, went on strike over wage cuts. 329 Some 3100 Pullman workers went on
strike. 330 The company refused to negotiate. 331 The Pullman strikers then appealed to the
American Railway Union (ARU). It, in turn, agreed to commence a “sympathy strike.” 332 ARU
workers refused to inspect, switch, or haul Pullman cars on any railroad line. 333
Historically, equity courts had used injunctions sparingly, to abate private nuisances that
threatened irreparable harm to tangible property. 334 Somewhat implausibly, nineteenth century
courts seized upon this limited power to “regulate[] the clash of conduct in modern industry”
under the guise of containing “public nuisances,” a new concept. 335 In so doing, courts
dramatically expanded the notion of “property” which injunctions could protect and the number
of persons to whom a single injunction could apply. “Property” came to encompass anything of
value, including prospective but unrealized business transactions. 336 The injunctions that

322
See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582, 594 (upholding courts’ power to enjoin Pullman strikes and hold
violators in contempt).
323

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 63, 83, 95.

324

FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930).

325

See, ARCHIBALD COX et al., LABOR LAW 7 (15 ed. 2011); FORBATH, supra note 321, at 59-61 (noting
that state court cases for criminal conspiracy were a rarity compared to labor injunctions).
326

See COX, supra note 325, at 7, 15-17.

327

See id. This history is well recounted in numerous other sources. See, e.g., FORBATH, supra note 321;
DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 5 (1987); ELIAS LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR 30
(1950); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 131; EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930).
328

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 63.

329

See LIEBERMAN, supra note 327, at 30-32.

330

See id. at 32.

331

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 74.

332

See id.

333

See LIEBERMAN, supra note 327, at 32-33. The strike impacted mail delivery, which then precipitated
federal involvement. Id at 33.
334

FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 47.

335

Id. at 20, 24.

336

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 85.
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protected such property could bind thousands of workers. 337 Federal courts first used such
injunctions in the 1870s, 338 but it was the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 that fanned the
practice. 339
Although we remember the Sherman Act as a salvo against monopoly capital, in its first
several decades, nearly 20% of the cases brought under the Act were brought against labor unions
and their members. 340 Despite Congress’ intentions, 341 judges seized upon the Act’s general
language prohibiting “every contract [or] combination in the form of trust or otherwise . . . in
restraint of trade or commerce.” 342 This language provided a ready vehicle for a largely
republican federal bench 343 to check increases in trade union membership and activism between
1890 and 1929. 344 Although the Sherman Act itself did not expressly authorize the use of broad
labor injunctions, the Supreme Court approved the technique in 1895. 345
The labor injunction was a calculated net-widening tactic. 346 The scale of worker protest
coupled with local juries’ sympathies limited criminal prosecutions’ effectiveness. Because labor
injunctions were civil suits in equity, judges rather than juries acted as the finders of fact in
contempt cases. The communities from which jurors were drawn often sympathized with
workers. 347 For example, of the criminal cases that arose from a Chicago garment strike in 1924
and went to jury trial, 0.2% resulted in convictions. 348 In contrast, of the cases in equity for labor
injunction violations, 99% resulted in decisions against the worker. 349

337
See id. at 83-84; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 86, 123, 126; see also In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 597 (1895) (reasoning that if courts have the power to enjoin one person from engaging in particular conduct,
that power must extend to enjoining more than one person from engaging in the same conduct).
338

Labor injunctions evolved from federal decrees entered by courts to manage labor disputes involving
bankrupt railroads that were in federal receivership. See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 66-67.
339

Passage of the Norris LaGuardia Act in 1932 curtailed the practice. COX, supra note 325, at 27.

340

See BERMAN, supra note 327, at 4 (summarizing cases brought during the period from the Act’s passage
in 1890 until 1930). Nearly all of the cases during the Act’s first seven years were brought against labor unions. Id. While
some injunctions were obtained under state law, see, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896), the Sherman Act
became the primary vehicle for obtaining labor injunctions.
341
See BERMAN, supra note 327, at 51-53 (concluding from Congressional debates that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to apply to labor organizations).
342

COX, supra note 325, at 18 (quoting the Sherman Act) (internal quotations omitted).

343

See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (“[I]t is the duty of
government to protect the one against the many, as well as the many against the one.”); see also FORBATH, supra note 321,
at 63.
344

See MONTGOMERY, supra note 327, at 258, 289, 332 (noting relationship between economic climate,
trade unionism, and strikes).
345
The Sherman Act was first invoked in 1893 in support of a labor injunction. See FORBATH, supra note
321, at 71. The Court approved of the practice in In re Debs in 1895. 158 U.S. 564, 594, 599 (1895); see also Deitrich
Loewe v. Martin Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 302 (1908) (citing United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F.
994 (1893), which concluded that Congress intended for the Sherman Act to apply to organized labor).
346
See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 95 (noting that the courts frequently pointed to the inability of
traditional criminal prosecutions to “deter such vast conspiracies”). The Sherman Act actually contained criminal
provisions and, of course, state criminal laws forbidding conspiracy also remained on the books.
347

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 101.

348

See id. (two convictions out of roughly 900 prosecutions).

349

See id. (255 convictions out of 258 cases, most of which were for engaging in peaceful protest).
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Labor injunctions covered wide swathes of conduct, a good bit of which was
independently punishable as crime. 350 For instance, the injunction in In re Debs, 351 prohibited
railroad workers “from in any way or manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping
any of the business” of certain named railroads. 352 The general prohibition was accompanied by
several very specific ones – e.g., it forbade workers from “injuring or destroying any part of the
tracks, roadbed, or road” and “interfering with . . . signals or switches.” 353 This combination of
breadth and specificity was typical. 354
The conduct rules in labor injunctions often extended to whole communities. The
injunction at issue in Debs is, again, illustrative. It applied to “all persons combining and
conspiring with [the named defendants], and all other persons whomsoever.” 355 Courts drafted
labor injunctions so as to bind large numbers of workers regardless of whether they were parties
to the case or not. The breadth of these injunctions created correspondingly broad arrest authority.
For example, in 1917, during the first two weeks of a ladies garment workers’ strike, police
arrested 1,000 workers for violating court orders. 356 This was not unusual. 357 Because conduct
rules in the injunctions were often expressed in sweeping terms, judges had ample room to
sanction. 358 Although convictions were rare in comparison to arrests, judges had considerable
discretion to impose fines and jail time for injunction violations. 359
The labor injunction’s advent was, in substantial measure, a function of the anxieties of
the Protestant middle-class (who constituted the ranks of federal judges) about the working
classes. 360 Employers were quick to use unlawful violence against workers – the private security
employers used to break up strikes often carried labor injunctions in hand when going about their
brutal strike-busting. 361 Notwithstanding, it was rare for courts to enjoin employer violence. 362
This speaks to the profoundly skewed ways in which judges and the public viewed striking
workers. Judges readily imagined workers as predisposed to disobedience. 363
Workers’ proclivity for disobedience was imagined in two registers. First, thick ribbons
of socialist sentiment ran through trade unionism. 364 The antagonism towards laissez-faire
capitalism expressed by mass organizations like the Knights of Labor and Industrial Workers of

350

FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 105.

351

Id. at 18-19.

352

In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 570.

353

Id. at 571.

354

Id.

355

In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 570 (italics added). The injunction in Gompers contained very similarly
language. See 221 U.S. at 452 fn. *. Most labor injunctions did. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 88-89.
356

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 107.

357

See id. at 108.

358

FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 113 (union sympathizer held in contempt of a labor
injunction for using the word “scab”).
359

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 107; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 324, at 58.

360

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 30 n.58, 63, 83, 94.

361

See COX, supra note 325, at 18; FORBATH, supra note 321, at 111.

362

FORBATH, supra note 321, at 118.

363

See id. at 126-27.

364

See id at 12-13.
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the World was particularly worrisome to employers and the federal judiciary. 365 “Sympathy
strikes” and “secondary boycotts” in particular, inspired deep judicial anxiety about economic
aggregation and worker radicalism. 366 Such protests could galvanize entire working class
communities. 367 Judges did not hesitate to unleash vitriol against worker radicalism in their
opinions. 368 This was a view that media outlets were also happy to propagate along with antiforeign invective. 369
Second, in many industries and especially at the lowest rungs, non-Anglo-Saxon
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe dominated labor. 370 Their arrival inspired broad
anxiety among middle-class whites. 371 There was also widespread animosity toward these
immigrants’ inability to assimilate given their non-Anglo cultural practices. 372 A late nineteenthcentury patrician would have been surprised to hear that these newcomers’ children would be
perceived as full-fledged white Americans in the course of one or two generations. 373 That
process of white racialization, however, was far from complete by the close of the nineteenth
century. Notwithstanding, trade unionists and immigrants had secured allies in Congress. 374 Thus,
it was left to courts to control the decidedly, non-American rabble clamoring for a socialist
state. 375
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Gompers appears to have restrained
courts’ power to use labor injunctions. 376 But, as suggested in Section I.B, Gompers left courts
considerable discretion to impose and enforce such injunctions. 377 Accordingly, courts continued

365
See id. at 12-13, 48-49; see also MONTGOMERY, supra note 327, at 312-13 (the historical overlap with
the Russian Revolution in 1917 amplified employer hostility to unions).
366

FORBATH, supra note 321, at 60, 60 n. 2. “Sympathy strikes” were boycotts organized to show solidarity
with workers protesting some other company. Id. at 60 n.3. In a “secondary boycott” unions urged their members and the
public not to purchase the products of companies that did business with the targeted employer. Id.
367
In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 581-82. The Supreme Court saw this as a serious dilemma: “If all the inhabitants
of a state, or even a great body of them, should combine to obstruct interstate commerce . . . prosecutions for such offenses
had in such a community would be doomed in advance to failure.” Id.
368

FORBATH, supra note 321, at 33, 63-64.

369

See TROY RONDINONE, THE GREAT INDUSTRIAL WAR, FRAMING CLASS CONFLICT IN THE MEDIA 19651950 88, 100-01, 123 (2010); Christopher R. Martin, The News Media and Strikes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRIKES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, 44-45 (Aaron Brenner et al. eds. 2009).
370

See RAFTER, supra note 31, at 127.

371

Id.

372

See id.

373

See generally DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS 27-34 (2005) (arguing that the
constructing the notion of “ethnicity” allowed southern and eastern European immigrants to become “white” over time);
see also NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 103 (1995) (suggesting that unions in 19th century aided in
“assimilating the Irish into white America).
374
Those allies would ultimately succeed in enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which significantly
curtailed federal labor injunctions. See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 158-66.
375
Media depictions were unvarnished in their negative representations of immigrants and their
revolutionary predilections. See RONDINONE, supra note 369, at 123.
376

221 U.S. at 419-20. The American Federation of Labor’s leadership challenged orders of contempt
entered against them for violating a labor injunction. Id. The AFL had disobeyed an injunction prohibiting a secondary
boycott. Id. at 441.
377

Id. (explaining that “character and purpose” of punishment determine whether it is civil or criminal).
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to aggressively use them to manage worker protest up until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932, which curtailed the practice. 378
D. Coda: Government By Injunction
Punitive injunctions represent “government by injunction” in each of the contexts that
have been discussed. They are a technique of discipline and social control that deviates from our
traditional understanding of what courts are supposed to do. 379 Alternatively, they might reveal
the extent to which our traditional understanding of the judicial function is highly idealized.
Courts have long-wielded powers that have a despotic air: “government by injunction” may just
be a question of quantity rather than quality.
Our idealized account of courts centers on the “power to decide.” 380 This is the limited
power to authoritatively resolve individual disputes pursuant to private or public law with the goal
of achieving individualized justice. 381 Courts are emblems of democratic equality in this regard:
all those appearing before a court are equals. 382 The ideal conception assumes a system of
legislative governance. A legislature should have, a priori, defined conduct of the sort alleged by
the plaintiff to be wrongful. It also should have specified whether wrongful conduct is subject to
civil or criminal process. The values of notice and evenhandedness are particularly important in
the criminal context because, on average, our system takes deprivations of liberty more seriously
than deprivations of property. Procedural rules reflect that judgment, providing greater protections
in criminal than in civil cases.
Punitive injunctions do not conform to this ideal. The discussion of labor injunctions
above, in part, sought to illustrate punitive injunctions’ vintage. In truth, the vintage may be even
more ancient. Contempt has been described as an “inherent power” of courts. 383 The same has
been said of the power to suspend a criminal sentence and impose conditions. 384 An inherent
378

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 143, 158-66.

379

In using the expression “power to discipline,” I take a page from Michel Foucault. See FOUCAULT, supra
note 232. But it really is only a page. Foucault looked closely at the point of power’s application to the body. Id. at 128.
His understanding of power cannot be reduced to an account of a single institution. Id. at 131. The brand of judicial power
that I am concerned with would likely be a “minor process,” id. at 138-39, or “technology of power” in Foucault’s terms.
Id. at 131. I also assume that dominant norms can pre-exist power’s exercise. In contrast, Foucault suggests that the
relation between dominant norms and disciplinary power is non-linear and mutually constitutive. Id. 183-84.
380

See ex rel. Louis Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 816.

381

See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983) (quoting Owen Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 755-56 (1982)) (“[T]he interpretation of the judge is uniquely
authoritative [because] judicial interpretation is authoritative in the sense that it legitimates the use of force against those
who refuse to accept or give effect to the meaning embodied in that interpretation [and] individual has a moral duty to
obey the judicial interpretation. . . [because] the judge is part of an authority structure that is good to preserve.”).
382

See Judith Resnik, Fairness In Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Conception, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91 (2011) (contending that the “egalitarian exchanges of mutual recognition [in
court] make adjudication itself a democratic practice”).
383

See, e.g., Gompers, 221 U.S. 440-44. One might think that in a constitutional democracy an inherent
power was simply an enumerated one. That, however, is not the case for the contempt power. There is no mention of it in
the Constitution. See Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (per Article III, “[t]he judicial power is the power to decide” and nothing
else) (Scalia, J., concurring).
384

See, e.g., Recent Case, Criminal Law – Suspended Sentence – Necessity of Jury Trial to Determine
Violation of Condition Only, 40 HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (1926); but see Ex Parte U.S., 242 U.S. 27 (1933) (concluding
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power is one that need not be enumerated in a Constitution or statute – it simply is what a court is.
Punitive injunctions are redolent of monarchical absolutism. The power to discipline
hails from courts’ unmediated authority to sanction a subject population. The goal was not
individualized justice, but rather to preserve the sovereign’s dignity. Of that point, the history of
“direct contempt” is illustrative. 385 At English common law, direct contempt was considered an
affront to the King and could be punished summarily. 386 Because courts were an extension of
monarchical prerogative and because the King had a monopoly on state violence, courts had
unmediated power to punish direct contempt: the judge, at the King’s behest, could send the
contemnor straight to jail. 387 To this day, the conduct rules enforced through direct contempt need
not be codified in advance of a court’s sanction. Those appearing in court must perform rites of
respect that are not codified – e.g., standing when the judge enters or exits, using appropriate
honorifics, and heeding the judge’s instructions. Direct contempt’s emphasis on “obedience,
cooperation, and respect” reflect monarchical sovereignty’s deep etching. 388
These “inherent powers” are a species of what Markus Dubber has called “police
power.” 389 Police power is antithetical to legislative governance. 390 In a careful historical survey,
Dubber describes the police power as the sovereign power to manage a “household” and those in
it. 391 “Households” encompass a range of social organizations from a literal household to entire
countries. For example, Dubber describes how in monarchical England, society was organized as
a series of hierarchical households with the King as the ultimate householder. 392 Household
members were subjects, not citizens. 393 Chief among the police power was the householders’
unmediated power to discipline subordinates. 394 In monarchical England, that power included the
discretion to physically beat subordinates. 395 And courts were extensions of the sovereign. While
our expectation of courts has evolved considerably, their monarchical lineage is still discernible.
III. RESTRAINING PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS
Legislatures should greatly curtail mass justice courts’ use of punitive injunctions.
that courts do not have inherent power to suspend sentence and impose conditions). Most jurisdictions, however, enacted
probation statutes to fill the gap left by the Ex Parte U.S. decision. See, Logan, supra note 34, at 175-76.
385
GOLDFARB, supra note 55, at 50-52, 68-79 (Direct contempt is an “aggressive offense[] . . . aimed at the
court itself.”). Today, the power to sanction for direct contempt is often codified, although the rules, characteristically,
leave much to judicial discretion. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (allowing summary punishment of contempt where
committed in judge’s presence and “if the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so certifies”).
386

Id. at 12.

387

See GOLDFARB, supra note 55, at 12.

388

See GOLDFARB, supra note 55, at 11.

389

See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005) (discussing the origins of the police power).
390

See id. at 3, 82 (referring to such governance as legal).

391

See id. at 3-8.

392

See id. at 16.

393

See id. at 49-50.

394

See id. at 31, 40.

395

A prerogative that found particularly pitched, racist expression in the South. See id. at 31-32, 61-62.
Markus Dubber has provided a thorough account of the police power’s export to the United States and its deeply fraught
relationship with republican ideals of popular governance. See id. at 81-93.
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Eliminating, or least significantly curtailing, the power will make for more effective reform than
imposing additional procedural safeguards will. If reform were limited to just the latter, punitive
injunctions could be even further entrenched as a tool for containing the poor and socially
marginal. Procedural protections – particularly constitutionally mandated ones – create the
symbolic air of individualized justice. That appearance of justice, however, may very well
contribute to the further obfuscation of punitive injunctions’ undemocratic consequences. This
outcome, I fear, could be true even if the Court concluded that there is a constitutional right to
appointed counsel for individuals like Mr. Turner.
Turner illustrates why additional procedural protections are unlikely to make very much
difference in cases like Mr. Turner’s. Like Gompers one hundred years before it, Turner
introduces procedural restraints that are easily manipulated by lower courts. Turner held that, as a
matter of due process, family court judges must make an express finding that an alleged
contemnor is able to pay before failing to jail him for having failed to actually do so. 396 The
Turner Court emphasized “the need for accuracy” in order to minimize the “risk of wrongful
incarceration,” 397 echoing the familiar due-process balancing framework established in Mathews
v. Eldridge. 398 It would have been easy enough for the family court judge to put the words, “I find
Mr. Turner able to pay” on the record. Post-Turner, a family court judge who is unsure of whether
an individual can pay will have as much latitude to see what (if anything) incarceration will shake
out of him. As with Gompers one hundred years before, Turner formalizes the practice that it
purports to restrain. 399
One could plausibly argue that the Court simply got the balance wrong here – i.e., that
due process should require provision of free counsel or some other more stringent procedural
protection. 400 While requiring free counsel would have been a better result than what the Court
actually decided in Turner, how much difference it would make is a real question. Defense
attorneys in mass justice contexts are not able to provide the kind of rigorous, individualized
advocacy that our idealized notions of judicial process might have us believe. 401 Defense counsel
might end up playing a role in facilitating quicker, more cursory process in mass justice
contexts. 402 Accordingly, we should be skeptical of procedural fixes that are unaccompanied by
systematic re-thinking about how particular judicial institutions exercise power.

396

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).

397

Id. at 2518.

398

See id. at 2517. Any number of commentators have criticized the fundamental premise of interest
balancing. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 382, at 158-59 (citing Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 46 (1976) (Mathews purports to convert issues constitutional values into a technocratic, empirical
question.). The Court does not purport to answer the Mathews factors with empirical certainty. Rather, it simply answers
the questions with impressionistic conclusions. See, e.g., Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2519 (“[T]here is available a set of
‘substitute procedural safeguards,’ which, if employed together, can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty.”) (internal citation omitted); Mashaw, supra note 398, at 39.
399

Supra notes 376-377 (discussing Gompers).

400

See Resnik, supra note 382, at 158-60.

401

See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 288-89; FEELEY, supra note 128, at 81, 82, 86-90 (describing public
defenders’ high case loads, lack of resources and their tendency to “burn out”).
402
See, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 128, at 189-92 (describing defense counsel’s role in plea negotiations); but
see id. at 60 (presence of counsel “eliminates more gross displays of arbitrariness and favoritism”).
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A. Enjoining Punitive Injunctions
Mass justice courts’ ability to impose punitive injunctions should be substantially
curtailed, if not eliminated altogether. This proposal flows readily from the discussion in Section
II above. Commentators have long-recognized that mass justice courts do not behave consistently
with liberal notions of State power or individualized justice. To simply suggest doing away with
them, however, is fatuous. They are here to stay. Limiting the range of powers they enjoy is a
more plausible way of reconciling their existence with liberal ideals.
Liberal precepts counsel in favor of tightly circumscribing the State’s power to
incarcerate. The liberal justification for concentrating coercive power in the State is to permit
organized coexistence while maximizing liberty and equality. 403 Incarceration is a paradigmatic
form of state coercion. 404 Incarceration both deprives individuals of liberty and stigmatizes. Both
features hold true even for nominally “civil” detention: being jailed as a “deadbeat dad” or for
being in contempt of an NCO is unlikely to help one secure friends or social standing. 405 Liberal
theories of punishment require that such grave sanctions be reserved for those who violate
particularly salient public norms. 406 To the extent that the State attempts to maximize social utility
for a democratic majority, it should not do so at the expense of core individual rights, liberty and
equality being supreme. 407
The rationales offered for what I have called punitive injunctions are of a utilitarian
stripe. Probation is supposed to serve rehabilitative ends and, thereby, forestall future crime. 408
Child support orders are supposed to impel fathers to contribute (financially and otherwise)
toward raising their children. 409 Doing so, in theory, defrays welfare’s costs and facilitates
parental bonds between children and fathers. While theoretically plausible, there is scant
empirical evidence to suggest that either mechanism actually produces the salutary social benefits
promised. 410 Given how expensive incarceration is, there is good reason to think both are cost
403
Liberal theorists come in all stripes, but many notable writers in the liberal tradition would hold liberty
and equality as the fundamental building blocks for a social order. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 52-53
(1999) (The principles of equality and liberty apply to “the basic structure of society and govern the assignment of rights
and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages.”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 180 (1978) (describing different conceptions of equality, and focusing on the right to equal concern and
respect as a basic right from which other conceptions of equality derive); Michael Ignatief, The Myth of Citizenship, in
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 53, 75 (Ronald Beiner ed. 1995) (equality is a central feature of the liberal tradition).
404

See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 310,

312 (2004).
405
Moral theorists might argue that it is the stigmatizing quality of a sanction that makes it “criminal.” See
FEINBERG, supra note 66, at 98-99. I do not take up that debate here.
406

See Dolovich, supra note 404, at 400 (using Rawlsian device of the “original position” to argue that
punishment of “non-serious offenses” is only legitimate if doing so deters commission of “serious offenses”).
407

While not expressly writing with the liberal tradition, Herbert Packer’s theory of the criminal
punishment is broadly consistent with this formulation. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 61-63
(1968). He suggests that to be legitimate, criminal sanctions must be imposed pursuant to a utilitarian rule designed to
prevent wrongdoing generally. Id. But punishment for violating such a rule may only be imposed upon an individual who
is actually blameworthy. Id.
408

Supra Section II.B.2.

409

Supra Section II.A.

410

See HAYS, supra note 179, at 10, 19, 77 (noting that welfare reform was a “neo-liberal” experiment and
that there is no empirical evidence to support conclusion that the child support rules it created have been cost effective).
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ineffective. 411
Section II sought to demonstrate that the primary “utility” of probation and contempt is
marking and managing the lowest social economic classes in our society. Using the threat of
incarceration and actual incarceration for that purpose offends both liberty and equality principles.
The prescription here echoes liberal, retributive theories where the requirement of
blameworthiness is designed to protect individuals from undeserved punishment. 412 Individuals
should only be jailed if it can be said, with high levels of certainty, that their conduct was
wrongful. Many, perhaps most, probation revocations and family court detentions do not satisfy
this requirement. Jailing an individual longer for a probation violation than for the underlying
criminal conduct is inconsistent with retributive principles. Jailing someone for conduct that is not
criminalized at all – as is often true in the child support context – is also inconsistent with
retributive principles.
Suggesting that legislatures curtail mass justice courts’ power to use punitive injunctions
raises a host of classification questions. What, precisely, should count as a punitive injunction and
a mass-justice court? Rote sentences of probation in low-level criminal cases would certainly
count. As would child support orders in cases like Mr. Turner’s. The implication in the former
context is that courts and prosecutors should make determinations about detention based on the
nature of the underlying conduct. To the extent that prohibited conduct does not seem serious
enough to warrant a jail sentence or fine, the individual should go free. Probation should not be
available as a means to keep such cases “in the system.” In the child support context, the
implications of the prescription are even farther reaching. The State should not use detention in
lieu of welfare. Jailing individuals like Mr. Turner accomplishes virtually nothing for poor
mothers and children. Its primary function seems to be keeping tabs on the underclass and
generating symbolic meaning about the moral depravity of “deadbeat dads.” The former is not a
legitimate action for a liberal democracy to undertake. The second should be the province of
criminal law not welfare law. 413
This Section should not be taken as an argument for eliminating contempt or probation
altogether. Contempt often serves an important role in enforcing judgments. For example, in a
child support action between middle-class parents where one simply refuses to pay a courtordered award after extensive process, contempt may be the only way to compel payment. The
same holds true in any number of contests between private parties. With probation, there may be
non-mass justice contexts in which it functions, less as an instrument of population-based social
control, and more genuinely as a tool for rehabilitation.
The proposal here admittedly leaves a good bit of gray area. However, given the political
challenges that separate the normative prescription here from becoming a policy reality, it is
appropriate to leave the technocratic details to a later day.
B. Incremental Change
The sweeping changes suggested in Section III.A are unlikely to come to pass anytime
soon. There is virtually no chance that a Norris-LaGuardia equivalent will emerge in the
411

Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 11, at *22-27
(describing “staggering” costs of detaining child-support contemnors); see also HAYS, supra note 179, at 77 (stating that
child support enforcement is not cost effective).
412

See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 407, at 62-63.

413

See Steiker, supra note 106, at 803-05 (blaming, a symbolic act, is criminal punishment’s function).
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probation or child-support contexts. Passed by Congress in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
curtailed labor injunctions. Labor unions and supporters in Congress had, for decades, advocated
for such legislation. 414 Unions, workers, and their supporters amassed political power during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 415 Those who constitute the contemporary ranks of
America’s “dangerous classes” and “problem populations” are not politically organized. Nor is
there is much popular sympathy for them. 416 These political facts have driven America’s
increased reliance on punitive techniques for managing poverty over the last three decades. 417
The absence of broad-based support for curtailing punitive injunctions means that only
modest reforms are likely possible for the near term. We should not be satisfied with any one of
the following as a complete solution to the problems described in this Article. But, they may be
steps in the direction of a more just detention policy.
Provide free counsel. Providing public defenders (or the functional equivalent in family
court) would be a step in the right direction. This cannot be the answer in and of itself for reasons
already noted. 418 But, there are two ways in which appointed counsel could help.
First, attorneys will increase the factual accuracy of courts’ determinations. The average
increase in accuracy may not be dramatic, but counsel would be a good check on more egregious
manifestations of error and bias. 419 Any increase in accuracy would be positive. There is no
reason to develop the case for appointed counsel here at length since the argument has been made
elsewhere. 420 The Supreme Court noted (in Turner, ironically enough): “the freedom ‘from bodily
restraint,’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” 421 Criminal
detention is, therefore, only permissible after a defendant has had an opportunity to present her
defenses with “skill and knowledge.” 422 This should be true whenever custodial detention is at
issue. Even if the Court will not go so far in interpreting the Due Process Clause, the argument
remains morally compelling. 423 And state legislatures, where they haven’t already, 424 should
414

See FORBATH, supra note 321, at 147.

415

See id. at 147-48, 162-63. The damage may very well have been done by 1932, though. William Forbath
has persuasively argued that labor injunctions involved the courts in the violence faced by trade unionists and removed
local officials’ authority in responding to protests. See id. at 1-9. Well before 1930, labor injunctions had helped channel
American trade unionism into a liberal, reformist movement as opposed to a radicalized, class-consciousness based
movement. See id.
416

See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 82-83 (describing the perception that recipients of welfare programs
are lower-class blacks “mired in idleness and vice” and stating that such racial animus and class prejudice perception has
made it impossible for those on welfare to politically organize); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 43-45
(2010) (discussing political discourse surrounding poverty, including the school of thought that character failings
accounted for poverty).
417
See WACQUANT, supra note 27, at 41, 43, 58 (explaining opposition by suggesting that amongst middleclass voters, welfare is understood to benefit poor blacks).
418

See supra notes 400-402 and discussion.

419

While one should not expect dramatic increases in accuracy across cases, one can expect state-appointed
counsel to control “the more gross displays of arbitrariness and favoritism.” FEELEY, supra note 128, at 60.
420

See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at *27-50 (discussing the importance of the right to

counsel).
421

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
422

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).

423

See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (due process requires appointment of counsel and
other procedural protections associated with criminal proceeding in juvenile delinquency proceeding).
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adopt it.
Attorneys also help ensure that there is a stream of empirical information about the
effects of states’ punitive practices. Attorneys who work with indigent clients are in unique
position to collect and disseminate such information. Judith Resnik recently observed that, among
the chief benefits of pro bono counsel taking Mr. Turner’s case to the Supreme Court was that
they revealed how paltry the procedural safeguards are in South Carolina family court contempt
proceedings. 425 Relying on pro bono counsel to litigate an occasional, high profile case to
generate such information is better than nothing, but not by very much. Part of what allows the
practices this Article describes to remain undisturbed is their invisibility. Counsel helps disrupt
that invisibility.
Allow for modification of arrears. Federal welfare law makes it impossible to modify
past arrears and difficult to modify child support awards going forward. 426 As discussed above,
this restriction helps ensure that once caught in the penal web, poor fathers remain there. After the
passage of some amount of time it becomes impossible for poor fathers to pay the entirety of their
accumulated arrears. Quite preposterously, arrears continue to mount while fathers are in custody
for having violated a child support order (or for any other reason). Arrears oftentimes include
interest payments. Large arrears mean that such fathers remain vulnerable to incarceration for
years and potentially even past their children reaching the age of maturity. 427 Allowing courts to
modify arrears would help avoid this. Reducing arrears to manageable levels may induce some to
make payments. States might actually stand to collect a small bit of revenue rather than spend a
good bit on incarceration.
Courts should also regularly revisit child support orders and reevaluate whether the
ordered amount is within the fathers’ ability to pay. This would be less necessary if there was a
prohibition on the entry of child support orders in absentia.
Restrict the no new criminal law violation condition. The condition that probationers
commit no new criminal law violations appears in virtually every probation order. 428 As described
in Section II.B.1, this condition makes it easier for prosecutors to obtain new convictions for
alleged misconduct than they otherwise could. 429 This condition also helps ensure that individuals
remain enmeshed in the carceral web for longer. Remaining in that web for longer is appropriate
if an individual actually commits new crimes. As described above, however, the NCLV condition
increases prosecutors’ leverage to obtain a plea of guilt on new criminal charges. 430 That
compromises the accuracy of any subsequent conviction obtained by plea – both the guilty and
innocent have the same incentive to plead guilty in the face of a prosecutor’s threat to move for
probation revocation. One solution to this problem is to simply eliminate the NCLV condition.
Another plausible solution might be to restrict its application to cases in which guilt on the new
criminal law charge has been found after a trial on the new criminal law charge.
Require a hypothetical custodial sentence. As noted in Section II.B, it is entirely possible

424

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that its state constitution requires that the state appoint counsel in
contempt proceedings for child support violations. See, e.g., Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 676 (N.J. 2005).
425

Resnik, supra note 382, at 160.

426

See supra note 214 and discussion.

427

See supra notes 213-217 and discussion.

428

See supra notes 281-286 and discussion.

429

See id.

430

See id.
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for defendants to spend more time incarcerated on probation violations than they would have on
the underlying criminal charge for which they were convicted. 431 This is perverse from a
retributive perspective. It is, however, difficult to make quantitative, empirical claims about this
phenomenon with precision. When judges suspend a sentence and release someone on probation –
as is so often true in minor cases – they do not say what amount of time they would have
sentenced a person to jail were probation not a component of the sentence. Indeed, part of the
point that this Article has tried to make is that probation saves courts from having to make such a
calculation. If judges were to actually do so (in good faith), 432 that declaration would serve as a
good yardstick for measuring the fairness of any subsequent detention precipitated by probation
revocation.
For example, take our hypothetical defendant from the Introduction. 433 Under the scheme
proposed here, upon sentencing, the judge would have said that one month in jail was the
appropriate punishment for the narcotics and theft misdemeanors. The defendant then would
receive an actual sentence of probation. Upon any subsequent probation violation, the
hypothetical custodial sentence of one month would serve as a guidepost for imposing jail time. 434
Perhaps even more importantly, hypothetical sentences would help generate important
information about probation’s detention-related costs.
Systematically study institutional practices. The rationale typically offered for punitive
injunctions is utilitarian: that these mechanisms generate social utility to justify their costs. 435 In
Turner, South Carolina never suggested that it had studied the costs and benefits of its family
court detention practices. As noted repeatedly above, there is little precise quantitative data about
the frequency and duration of incarceration for violating a punitive injunction. While threatening
detention is cheap, actual detention is quite expensive. It is far from clear that, in the aggregate,
using contempt to enforce child support orders against poor fathers is cost effective. 436 Similar
skepticism of probation seems justified – particularly if significant numbers of individuals are
spending more time in jail as a result of probation violations than they would have had they
simply been sent to jail on the underlying criminal charge. States should study these questions
empirically. It may very well be that punitive injunctions are harmful not only for the
communities impacted, but also for states’ bottom line.
IV. CONCLUSION
That social problems related to community health and well-being are conceptualized on a
population basis is inevitable in a modern state. We expect an entire range of state agencies to
engage problems in just such a way: Health and Human Services ought to be concerned with
decreasing incidences of disease within the United States, Housing and Urban Development ought
to be concerned with minimizing homelessness, and so on. We, however, tend to think of courts
as serving a very different function than such agencies. Courts are supposed to guarantee justice
431

Cf. Bowers, supra note 287, at 792 (describing studies of New York City drug courts).

432

A profound weakness in this prescription is the room it leaves for easy manipulation.

433

See supra notes 20-22, 79 and discussion.

434

Another approach might be to require judges to suspend no more than the actual sentence that would
have been imposed. This would, however, create fairly powerful incentives to impose higher sentences on the front end –
i.e., to maximize sentencing discretion upon finding a probation violation.
435

See supra notes 186-194, 231-235 and discussion.

436

See supra notes 196-198 and discussion.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss2/4

17.2_SEKHON_PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS FORMATTED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PUNITIVE INJUNCTIONS

5/8/2014 3:58 PM

219

in individual cases – they are supposed to check the unfairness that can result from populationbased approaches to social problems. The way punitive injunctions are used in mass justice courts
calls this understanding of courts into question. That should, in and of itself, be troubling to legal
scholars.
This Article has also shown the significant role that punitive injunctions play in
enmeshing the poor and socially marginal in what sociologists have termed a penal web. This
occurs without these injunctions serving the various utilitarian ends that they were, theoretically,
designed to serve. This account both supports the sociological claim that poverty has been
criminalized in the United States and suggests a reform trajectory. Contrary to what legal scholars
have suggested, simply adding layers of procedural protection to the enforcement proceedings for
these injunctions is not likely to be particularly helpful. Rather, legislatures should move toward
curtailing courts’ power to impose such injunctions at all.
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